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ity on the court was astounding. The players were a credit to the game and their countries.

Aside from Buddy Pontiac, Inc., the organizations contributing to the tournament were the U.S. Lawn Tennis Association, the Greater Washington Tennis Association, the District of Columbia Department of Recreation, the National Capital Park Service, the District of Columbia Public Schools, and the District of Columbia Youth Opportunity Services. Assisting were the Courtesy Patrol, the Metropolitan Boys Club, and the Police Boys Club. The tournament received prominent coverage in the Washington newspapers, and Sunday's play was shown live on the Eastern Educational Television Network—WETA, channel 26. Thus, the tournament had official and voluntary support from a variety of sources.

Mr. President, you and others in this chamber may be aware of my feelings with respect to football and baseball, especially if the competition involves a team from Minnesota. I am certainly not blind, however, to the civic consciousness revealed in the account which I have just given you of an attempt to engage the interest of inner-city youth in a major sport which should be more and more accessible to people in our crowded cities. I hope that tournaments of this kind will stimulate demand for tennis courts and equipment throughout the cities of this land. We can only applaud the expressed wish of the tournament planners that out of such events will one day come "the Austin Carr of tennis" in Washington. For that matter, another Arthur Ashe would do just fine.

Mr. President, I request unanimous consent that certain items concerning the inner city tennis tournament be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1971]
TIEBREAKER RULE BRINGS CONFUSION: FILLOL TURNS ASIDE KOCH IN FIVE-SET TENNIS FINAL

(By Mark Asher)

Jaime Fillol of Chile continued his high level of tennis and defeated Thomaz Koch of Brazil, 6-1, 3-6, 6-4, 6-7, 6-4, for the Buddy Pontiac International championship yesterday at McKinley High School.

The even match between two South Americans, who had split six previous encounters in the past two years, turned on Koch's confusion about the rule on who serves first following a best-of-nine-point tiebreaker game.

Koch served the final three points and staved off a quadruple match point to win the fourth-set tiebreaker, 5-4. The tiebreaker is counted as a single game and in this case was counted as Fillol's service game.

According to the rules Koch should serve the next game. But Fillol was given the balls and served the first point of the fifth set before Halg Tufenk, the umpire, rectified the situation. Koch had won the point, which did not count.

"I was confused," the long-haired Brazilian said. "When I served I really wasn't in it."

SERVICE PROBLEMS HURT

Koch lost his service and each player then proceeded to hold his serve for the remainder of the match. But Koch noted he never should have been in such a predicament because he lost a 4-2 advantage in the third set when he ran into service problems and

lost 16 of 18 points in dropping four straight games.

Tufenk explained the tiebreaker situation: "The problem is that neither the players nor the ballboys know the rules. It's the first time the tiebreaker has been used in Washington."

The tiebreaker is newly implemented on the indoor circuit this year as the game of tennis reaches streamlined proportions for television and attempts to lose its country club image.

EVERYBODY CONFUSED

Coincidentally, this player confusion arose at the nation's first professional indoor tournament at an indoor city facility. If the players were confused, imagine the confusion of the inner-city youth to whom the tournament was directed as a pilot project to expose them to the sport.

Following the match, one youngster turned to a reporter and asked, "Hey, mister. Who beat?"

In an informal survey, the youngsters in the crowd of 1,200 were most confused by tennis' traditional scoring system, which scores four points as 15, 30, 40 and game. They also wanted to know most about how much money the players make.

The scoring system made about as much sense to most of the 400 youths as the scoring in a cricket match does to the average American.

Bill Gaskins, the tournament director, said he would favor experimenting with a simplified scoring system next year. In addition, both he and the players did not object to noise during the match.

Both Fillol and Koch stopped play frequently yesterday. But Koch noted this was not because of the noise, but because of the movement behind the court, making it difficult for the players to follow the flight of the ball.

As for money, Fillol won about \$20,000 last year. He is not considered among the world's 25 best players. The \$1,500 he pocketed yesterday was the biggest payday of his career. Koch won \$1,000. The match was the first loss in Washington by Koch, the winner of the 1969 Washington Star International.

Jim Osborne and Jim McManus of the United States defeated Juan Gisbert and Manuel Orantes of Spain, 3-6, 6-3, 6-3, for the doubles title.

BUDDY PONTIAC INC. WELCOMES AMERICA'S FIRST INNER-CITY TENNIS TOURNAMENT

It is seldom that an individual or an institution is presented the opportunity to make a major contribution to an important cause. With this thought in mind, I should like to assure our honorary chairman, Mayor Walter Washington, our distinguished guests and all of the students attending the matches, that it is our sincere pleasure and our privilege to be associated with this event.

We are extremely grateful to Mr. William Riordan, player chairman for the U.S.L.T.A. for bringing to us an outstanding field of players; to the Greater Washington Tennis Association for their fund raising support; to Henry Kennedy our chairman for his expertise and general assistance; and certainly to Dr. James Jones, Director of Youth Opportunity Services, and his competent staff, who did so much to make ours a "first class" tournament in every respect.

As one who was born, schooled and has worked in the "inner city" during his entire lifetime, I can speak from experience regarding our progress to date and what still lies ahead in order to make our city into a model for the entire nation.

In recent years we have accomplished much, primarily through the utilization of government funding. In the future we may accomplish much more through the involvement of private industry in neighborhood and youth projects throughout our city.

Our secret hope is that somewhere in the

grandstand sits tomorrow's Arthur Ashe, a boy who can go to the top of professional tennis, but be that as it may, we are certain that our matches and our high school tennis clinics will provide entertainment, challenge and personal fulfillment to the youth of our Nation's Capital . . . none deserve more.

Sincerely,

MORRIS W. COHEN,
President, Buddy Pontiac, Inc.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

I am happy to serve as honorary chairman of this Inner City Tennis Tournament that will stimulate interest in tennis among inner-city residents.

We welcome to our city these international tennis stars—representing seven countries—who will participate. Their wide-range representation and outstanding skills will provide an arena in which young minds can be challenged, international goodwill fostered and tennis promoted.

We are extremely gratified that our Nation's Capital has been selected as the inaugural city for this event. Hopefully, as a result of our efforts in this first "Inner-City" Tennis Tournament, next year we will see similar programs instituted in other major metropolitan areas throughout the nation.

Proceeds from this tournament will go to the Washington Interscholastic Tennis Association to aid our on-going inner-city tennis programs.

This tournament is made possible through the concerted efforts of Buddy Pontiac, Inc., the United States Lawn Tennis Association, the Greater Washington Tennis Association, the D. C. Department of Recreation, National Capital Park Service, D. C. Public Schools and the D. C. Youth Opportunity Services, with the assistance of the Courtesy Patrol, the Metropolitan Boys Club and the Police Boys Club.

This is another fine example of business, government, community organizations and individual citizens working together to better our community.

MAYOR WALTER E. WASHINGTON.

One of the more gratifying aspects of being a professional tennis player is watching interested youths developing their athletic talents in pursuit of becoming top-notch competitors. I am confident that seeing many of the world's top tennis players in action during this tournament will not only provide exciting sports entertainment for all but will inspire many potentially great athletes living in the inner-city to become seriously interested in the game of tennis as well.

Professional tennis, like football, basketball and baseball, now provides an excellent living for any underprivileged youth who works hard and makes it to the top. But more than that, the physical demands of tennis help develop a healthy mind and body for every boy or girl who plays the game.

I am very happy to welcome the many Washington area public school students to this great new tournament. You will be seeing outstanding champions competing for the title and prize money. I hope to compete here next year and challenge this year's winner. All of us owe a debt of thanks to Buddy Pontiac, Inc., for their successful effort to bring big-time tennis to the Washington inner-city.

Everyone cannot become a championship tennis player, but each of us can be a championship person—and that's what it's all about!

Sincerely,

ARTHUR ASHE.

THE SONTAY PRISON CAMP RAID

Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, Mr. Stuart H. Loory, one of the most percep-

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reality which the computer can deal with just because the computer can do so. The individual—the point off the curve—becomes an annoyance."

SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF INFORMATION

Another area of critical concern to those responsible for managing the massive machinery of our society relates to protecting the privacy of the individual and the corporate entity. The trend today is to gather vast amounts of information so that certain functions may be expedited. In government, the handling of social security, census, and economic data requires huge information processing establishments. In the private realm, hundreds of applications now involve ADP, including such large volume areas as payroll, credit checks, insurance, and industrial inventory control. The need for—and control of—these data are commencing to receive, deservedly, a great deal of attention. Some critics of large scale data collection and computer manipulation speak in terms of the Orwellian 1984 controlled state. Others can accept the necessity of acquiring data necessary for managing, through improved planning, our society, but believe that the present approach to the problem is not well thought out, and should receive cognizance at the highest level of government. Many hard questions have been put to those designing the census data collection forms, and a second wave of concern now is evident as summary data is being made available for sale by franchised disseminators.

Where do we draw the line on what is demanded of the private citizen, or the corporation? Should not the individual be able to refuse to answer certain questions about his past, and do so without penalty or censure? In some instances, today, information collected from citizens for one purpose is then vended to others for completely different purposes. The built-in protection inherent in the decentralized, paper-oriented files of the past now is being obliterated by the capacities and capabilities of computer-supported information systems. The elements of our society are entitled to privacy, and the integrity of any files containing information on their past activities or present status deserve the utmost protection.

It is not enough simply to indulge in fatuous generalities about protecting the privacy of the citizen. There are identifiable forms of safeguards which can do much to guarantee personal and corporate privacy. In a study prepared for the Congress—entitled "The Federal Data Center: Proposals and Reactions"—several such safeguards are noted:

1. Legislative and administrative regulations, already in effect in some agencies, could be augmented and strengthened.
2. Establishment of uniform, multi-agency criteria controlling "need to know" both for government and other data users.
3. More explicit explanation of the scope and nature of the data available, thus reducing the number of unnecessary or illogical requests by users.
4. Creation and uniform use of classification and coding systems, to include the assignment of unique accession codes and indicators to privileged data elements.
5. Establishment of an expert in-house group for receiving, transcribing, and refining the request for information from the system according to the needs of the users and existing regulations.
6. Employment of "a number of servicing procedures based upon computer technology that can satisfy the needs of the user in most cases without violating disclosure regulations.
7. In some instances, data reduction by design can be performed thus transforming absolute figures to percentages, increments to gross and vice versa.
8. Anonymous sampling, with the removal of identifying data elements already has been used; here again the need for a uniform Fed-

eral set of procedures and criteria is apparent.

TECHNOLOGY BEGETS RESPONSIBILITY

The management of information and knowledge is a solemn responsibility. The mutual education of the lawmakers and technologists during this forum must continue, for none can gainsay the crescendoing effect of computers, communications and cybernetics on this and succeeding generations. This must be a matter for all to acquaint themselves with, for everyone is affected. On some occasions in history man has been called upon to answer a "call" largely on faith. This led to the witticism that "Man is ready to die for an idea, provided that idea is not quite clear to him." Those existing in our "one world" know without question that empathetic interaction between individuals, groups, and nations is on the upturn, and that the trend is irreversible. Each new challenge requires a wrenching change in our patterns of behavior or institutional modes of operation.

While none of us can assess fully the impact of this burgeoning technology on the nation and its peoples, we must strive to manage wisely. The ways in which we use the atomic generator, the laser, the electronic computer, will result in more than surface reverberations. We are closer to manipulating our future than ever before, and there must be a conscious connection in our leadership actions between the thought, the desire, and the end result. While most of our national planning will and must be directed toward tangible, material ends, there is a greater responsibility. There is an overriding moral imperative to examine with excruciating thoroughness the rationale for our technological programs, the direct and side effects of their execution, and the imprint which will be carried forward into the future. This will require the finest effort on the part of all facets of our society, and will result in action based on reason, and not futility.

BUDDY PONTIAC INNER CITY INTERNATIONAL TENNIS TOURNAMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, over the weekend of February 5 through 7, a notable event took place in Washington, D.C. Twelve accomplished professional tennis players, including the top-ranked player in the United States, competed for \$10,000 in prize money on a synthetic court laid over the basketball floor of an inner city high school gymnasium. This tournament, the Buddy Pontiac, Inc., Inner City International Tennis Classic, was designed to bring first-class tennis to youngsters who may get no closer to the game in their ordinary lives than a blacktop playground or the side wall of an apartment building. A lot of dedication and idealism went into this tournament, and I believe that the results were most encouraging.

Donald Dell, the 1968-69 Davis Cup captain and a longtime Washington area resident, has often spoken of the need to bring tennis to the ghetto instead of waiting for the inner city black players and spectators to make their way out to the suburbs. Until this was done, he felt, tennis would remain a rich man's sport in the eyes of most black citizens. The few, like Arthur Ashe, who overcome innumerable handicaps to rise to the top in American tennis, would only prove the rule that tennis is a country club activity.

Bill Riordan, who did so much to make Salisbury, Md., the capital city of U.S.

indoor tennis, put his influence to work as president of the International Players Association and player coordinator for the U.S. tennis championship program. He lined up the 12 players who came to Washington on February 5. Next year he hopes to bring the inner city tennis tournament concept to a total of 13 American cities. This is a hopeful development, among other things because it is not a money-making venture for the promoters.

McKinley Technical High School, at Second and T Streets NE., is not the kind of place where you expect to see a tennis tournament. Although the court surface was excellent, there was too little room for the players along the sidelines and behind the baselines. The linesmen got in the way of sharply angled shots. High lobs bounced off the overhead lighting. Spectators constantly moved back and forth and talked almost incessantly. In other words, the audience treated this much as they would a baseball or basketball game, where formal etiquette hardly exists.

The great thing about it, however, was the attitude of both the players and the spectators. Not a single player expressed annoyance over crowd behavior or the constricted space around the court. To all appearances each of them realized that sacrifices had to be made for the purpose of presenting the best image of professional tennis to an audience which was largely unfamiliar with it. Although spectators had to be cautioned from moving directly in the line of sight of the players during the final singles match, the general deportment of the small crowd was excellent. When the youngsters and their parents overcame the mysteries of the scoring system, they followed the play with intense interest and genuine appreciation.

Attendance was sparse until the last day even though most of the seats were free of charge. On the first day, large numbers of young people were bused in. The audience was predominantly black, which was just what the tournament organizers had intended. Mayor Walter E. Washington, honorary chairman of the event, was present for part of the final match on Sunday.

The players came from Brazil, Chile, the British West Indies, Canada, Pakistan, Spain, and the United States. The best U.S. player was No. 1 ranking Cliff Richey, who lost a hard-fought semifinals match to the eventual winner, Jaime Fillol of Chile. Two other U.S. players included seventh-ranking Jim Osborne of Honolulu and ninth-ranking Jim McManus of Berkeley, Calif. The high point of the weekend was the five-set final between Fillol and Brazil's "Tiny Tom" Koch—pronounced "Kosh"—on Sunday. Koch, trailing two sets to one, broke Fillol's serve in the fourth set to set up a tiebreaker, which he won by a single point to even up the match. He was unable to hold off the Chilean in the fifth and final set. The crowd was treated to brilliant play. Both players wanted badly to win, but they never compromised their fine sportsmanship. They executed sharp volleys, crisp overheads and passing shots; their agil-

tive journalists in Washington and a representative of the Los Angeles Times, has written an excellent account of the recent raid on the Son Tay prison camp.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STORY BEHIND RAID ON SONTAY PRISON
(Stuart H. Loory)

WASHINGTON.—When Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird testified that the Administration had no way of knowing for certain that American prisoners would be found at Son Tay last November, he was understating an intelligence problem that gives American military planners the shivers.

Among all the other problems of fighting the war in Indochina, the problem of divining the intentions, plans and movements of the North Vietnamese has been the toughest.

That problem made the commando raid on the small compound only 23 miles west of Hanoi one of the biggest gambles in American military history—a gamble decided on by President Nixon for trying to get captured Americans out of North Vietnam but also for what one high Administration official has called "transcendent reasons."

Officially, the Son Tay raid was conducted for one reason only—to rescue American prisoners. Transcendent reasons are admitted only for the deepest background. But since the Administration admitted they existed, others have been speculating on what they might have been.

Idea No. 1: The American military machine, caught in a "dirty, grubby war" that no one wants, scarred by the tragedies at My Lai and stories of other atrocities, condemned at home and facing serious dissension in the field, needed an act of heroism to boost its morale.

Idea No. 2: The Nixon Administration, having helped create a prisoner-of-war lobby since grown impressively vocal, felt the political need to respond to its demands that something be done for the 339 Americans living under cruel conditions in North Vietnam.

Idea No. 3: The President had to show the North Vietnamese that they could not count on using the prisoners as hostages for a political settlement embarrassing to the United States, that he would take steps as drastic as invading North Vietnam to secure their freedom.

The President's gamble failed. To understand why, follow it from its inception late last May in a little-known office on the ninth corridor of the Pentagon's first floor.

Office 1E962 is marked "SACSA." The acronym stands for Special Assistance for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities."

It was SACSA that conceived, planned, organized and oversaw the Son Tay operation.

SACSA is both a military officer and the office he directs. The officer, at the time the Son Tay raid was conceived, was Brig. Gen. Donald Dunwoody Blackburn, a 54-year-old infantryman whose career has such great storybook qualities that it has been the subject of a book and a movie—"Blackburn's Headhunters."

As a first lieutenant, Blackburn arrived in the Philippines in October, 1941, to become an adviser to the Philippine army. The following April he evaded capture by the Japanese on Bataan Peninsula, disappeared into the jungles of northern Luzon, organized a small guerrilla force of primitive tribesmen who were just beyond the practice of headhunting and fought a backwoods campaign against the Japanese until the war ended.

Blackburn became one of the recognized experts in "special warfare," the military's euphemism for American involvement in pro-

tecting friendly governments against incipient revolution.

In 1957, when the 1954 Geneva accords which settled the French Indochina war were being honored mostly in the breach by all involved, Blackburn joined the American military assistance advisory group in South Vietnam to help shore up the Saigon government of Ngo Dinh Diem against the then-budding Viet Cong insurgency.

In August, 1969, after a series of assignments in the United States and Vietnam, Blackburn was named SACSA.

SACSA, the office, was created by President John F. Kennedy early in his administration to systematize the United States' role in dealing with insurgencies throughout the world.

SPECIAL WARFARE BIBLE

SACSA's doctrine was originally set out in a three-inch thick volume that became the bible of special warfare. Originally that bible dealt mostly with counterinsurgency.

The early counterinsurgency doctrine was based on the simple premise that American technology—the same know-how that would land a man on the moon and create a machine-aided life of comfort for consumers—would conquer insurgencies.

To gain superiority over a guerrilla who has lived in a region for years, you need only fight him in the dark, provided you can see and he cannot, the doctrine said. So radios were developed to penetrate the jungle canopy, helicopters that fly 80 m.p.h. over areas where guerrillas move on foot were brought in. Heat-seeking infrared sensors for detecting enemy campfires were developed.

The enemy found it relatively simple to deal with Western technology. Learning of the campfire detectors, for example, he simply ordered no campfires could be built within a mile of camp, and that rendered infrared sensors relatively useless.

So the insurgency in South Vietnam, instead of being brought under control, developed into the longest war the United States has ever fought. The few thousand American advisers of the early 1960s grew into a force of over half a million ground troops.

By the time Blackburn established himself in the Pentagon's Room 1E962, counterinsurgency had passed its heyday.

THINKS ABOUT CONTRIBUTION

Last May, as concern over the fate of American war prisoners in North Vietnam was rising throughout the country and the military, Blackburn began to think about what contribution of his office could make.

Blackburn studied what was then known of Son Tay and the other known North Vietnamese POW camps and decided that, if prisoners were held at Son Tay, it was the only location where a raiding party could land. The other known prisons are all in downtown Hanoi.

In June, he presented the idea of liberating some American prisoners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and received permission to conduct a "feasibility study."

"The initial phase started in June," Blackburn told the Times. "We really wanted to satisfy ourselves on the American prisoners."

Blackburn had consummate faith in the ability of the military to do the job without outside help. During the feasibility study, he called on the Central Intelligence Agency only minimally.

Working from reconnaissance photographs, the CIA built a scale model of the tiny compound, which was just over a half acre in all, the size of a medium-priced suburban housing lot, measuring 185 feet from north to south and 132 feet from east to west. The model was accurate right down to the location of branches on the trees.

"The CIA had a minimum participation in it," Blackburn said.

But the agency was apparently not asked

to contribute intelligence on the key question: were there or were there no prisoners at Son Tay?

The feasibility study was completed in July and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Laird. Mr. Nixon did not see it. Neither did Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's chief foreign policy adviser, nor anyone else on the National Security Council staff.

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Laird approved the feasibility study and gave the go-ahead for the drafting of a plan sometime in July.

Blackburn's team wrote a 200-page plan, a second-by-second scenario for the attempt, complete down to the assignments for each person and each piece of equipment involved. It even included proposals for diversionary air strikes over a wide area of northern North Vietnam.

"The further we got into the details, the more feasible the whole thing became," Blackburn said. "We had the plan broken down second by second. It was only five seconds from the time the choppers landed until we entered the first building where there were guards."

The detailed Son Tay plan was approved by Moorer and Laird in early August and, on Aug. 8, Air Force Brig. Gen. Leon J. Manor and Army Col. Arthur D. (Bull) Simons were selected as commander and deputy commander of Joint Contingency Task Force Ivory Coast, with orders to carry out Blackburn's plan.

Manor, 49, commander of the Air Force's Special Operations Force, headquartered at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., was chosen by the Air Force for the job. His selection was natural. The SOF, formerly named the Special Warfare Center, was established in 1961 as the Air Force's contribution to carrying out the original SACSA doctrine.

Simons, 52, like Blackburn, had experience in small-force operations going back to World War II in the Pacific, where he served as an officer in the Rangers—the forerunners of the Green Berets.

In 1961, he went to Laos as part of the White Star Mobile Training Team to help shore up the anti-Communist Laotian government in its civil war. In 1968, he went to Vietnam where, according to some reports, he played a role in infiltrating intelligence teams into North Vietnam.

Before Laird and Moorer approved the plan, they presented it to the President, who also approved. There is some indication that Kissinger was not told of the plan at that point, when all the momentum began for the raid three months later.

ASSEMBLED IN PANHANDLE

By Aug. 21, Joint Contingency Task Force Ivory Coast—101 men in all, half of whom would actually land at Son Tay—was assembled at Eglin, an 800-square-mile reservation in Florida's panhandle.

The go-ahead for training the Ivory Coast task force was made on the "assumption" that prisoners would be found at Son Tay.

Actually, based on the record, there appears to have been a far better chance that there would be no prisoners found.

"We've drilled a lot of dry wells there," Blackburn said, admitting candidly that each time American authorities staged a rescue based on intelligence information they had received, the raids came up late.

Blackburn lent credence to this judgment when he told his interviewer that several rescue attempts had been made in South Vietnam and none had been successful.

American prisoners were almost never found where they were reported to have been. The "almost" is significant.

In July, 1969, the South Vietnamese army learned from a defector that Spc. Larry D. Aiken of New York City, an infantryman, who had been captured two months earlier,

was being held by the North Vietnamese north of the town of Tamky in the northern part of South Vietnam. A joint South Vietnamese-American rescue attempt was organized. Alken was rescued—unconscious. The North Vietnamese had bashed his head in when the rescuers approached.

The rescue was publicized; Alken's death, three weeks later, went unreported.

Several of the nine former American prisoners who have been released by the North Vietnamese, other military officials and some who are knowledgeable about prisoner-of-war procedures now privately predict that future rescue attempts would result in grave danger to captives in North Vietnam.

"It is a bunch of crap that the prisoners would be shot up," Blackburn said. "I would have bet a year's salary that, when we got in there, not one would be hurt. There wasn't any way those guys could have been hurt. The enemy would have had to break into those cell blocks just like we did. And he would have been worrying about his own hide."

JOB HARDER IN NORTH VIETNAM

If gathering accurate intelligence about the enemy in South Vietnam is impossible, it is doubly so in North Vietnam.

One former general with long experience in Vietnam said, "Every jot and tittle of intelligence we get out of there is stale. It can't be fresh. If it is fresh you can be sure it's been planted to deceive us."

Blackburn said intelligence for the mission came from three sources—interrogation of captured North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam, captured documents and reconnaissance flights by American aircraft.

Captured documents and the captured North Vietnamese who carry them can hardly give an up-to-date account of what is happening in the north. It takes a minimum of three months for the typical North Vietnamese soldier to march down the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Aerial reconnaissance is another matter. The information that jet spy planes pick up can be carried back to South Vietnam, Thailand or some carrier at sea, processed and transmitted to Washington in hours.

Since World War II, American optical and aeronautical technologists have worked miracles with photography. Camera-carrying aircraft can snap stereo pictures from which interpreters can later divine such minute details as the size of bricks in a wall, vegetation on the ground, construction materials in a building.

CAN DETERMINE BUILDING HEAT

From infrared scanners, they can determine whether a building is heated.

From a series of pictures that would reveal traffic patterns, personnel movement, even such items as how garbage is disposed of, an experienced interpreter can make good deductions about what is going on on the ground.

There are two general hitches in aerial reconnaissance, as far as North Vietnam is concerned, and one particular hitch relating to Son Tay.

First, like so much in the Vietnam war, American reconnaissance technology was simply too sophisticated.

"They have consistently underflown our capability," Amrom H. Katz of Los Angeles, formerly of the RAND Corp. and a specialist in reconnaissance technology, said.

"For example, we are set up to spot trucks and they use bicycles. They operate just below our threshold."

After the Son Tay raid, Laird lamented that the technological approach had indeed not gone far enough. A camera that could see through roofs, Laird told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, could have indicated for certain if there were prisoners at Son Tay.

Laird's assertion is open to question. Pic-

tures are only as good as the men who read them.

That is the second hitch. A see-through camera might show people. Interpreters would have to have enough experience in studying North Vietnam to say whether the human forms are American prisoners.

The reconnaissance photos of Son Tay showed, according to Manor, that the topographical features of the courtyard were changing but the interpreters guessed wrong about the meaning of the change. They assumed that the changes, which showed a vegetable garden growing, were related to activities of the prisoners.

EXPERIENCE NECESSARY

To do a good job of interpreting photos of North Vietnam, interpreters with experience on the ground there are necessary. The United States has few, if any, such men.

Patrick J. McGarvey, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency tells the story of how interpreters, in early 1968, were searching pictures for targets of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

In one picture, they spotted a huge, heavily guarded compound at a village called Quynh Loc. The compound was isolated, ringed with barbed wire and included a number of buildings. Inside the compound were areas shut off from each other with more barbed wire. The conclusion of the interpreters, McGarvey said, was that the installation was a division headquarters. And so, a bombing raid was ordered against it on May 8, 1968.

A few days later the North Vietnamese charged that the United States had bombed a leper colony at Quynh Loc, killing 30 patients and wounding 34. Privately, according to McGarvey, the Pentagon later conceded the error.

The photo interpretation for the Son Tay mission was done by Christopher R. Guenther. For years Guenther has worked in DIA as an air defense specialist, studying pictures of the North Vietnamese countryside, picking out installations that would be of danger to American planes flying missions over North Vietnam.

He would not consent to an interview, but it is known from others that his work with the pictures shed no light on the question of whether there were prisoners at Son Tay. It was more concerned with the operational aspects of the raid—getting the commandos in and out safely.

The particular reconnaissance problem of Son Tay was that too many overflights would have alerted the North Vietnamese to impending danger.

Laird, however, testified that reconnaissance photos were the prime source of intelligence for the mission.

Neither the White House nor the Pentagon has disclosed the latest date on which the Administration knew for certain that Americans were being held at Son Tay.

SPOTTED AS POW CAMP IN 1967

Defense officials have said that it was spotted as a POW camp as far back as 1967. There has been one published report that last September a North Vietnamese defector, Tran Thual, told American psychological warfare officials that in 1967 he was a prison observer at Son Tay, which he knew as Lamson I.

Actually Thual's account was given to American intelligence experts earlier and was part of the intelligence report Blackburn received in May.

Officially, Pentagon spokesmen say they cannot disclose the last date on which they knew prisoners were at Son Tay because that, in turn, would compromise intelligence-gathering procedures. It is not unfair to speculate that it would prove a source of embarrassment to the Pentagon as well.

The assumption can be made that the last definite date was before Blackburn even

started studying the feasibility of the raid. In fact, it might have been the information on which he originally began the study.

Once training began toward the end of August, the matter of whether there were prisoners at Son Tay became, in a sense, secondary. The operation had achieved a life of its own.

The mission planners were aiming toward two possible dates—they called them "windows." One was in October and one in November, when a quarter moon would be shining on Son Tay—a moon bright enough to give some light but dim enough to cover movements of the raiders.

The October date was scrubbed because of weather forecasts. At least, that is the official version. The possibility must be raised, however, that such matters as the impending congressional elections in the United States played some role in putting the raid off.

ABRAMS WAS NOT INFORMED

At that point, not even Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, commander of all Americans in Southeast Asia, had been informed that the raid was in prospect.

In early November, Blackburn and Manor flew to Saigon and briefed Abrams and Gen. Lucius D. Clay Jr., commander of the American air forces in Southeast Asia, on the plans.

There has been one report that Abrams opposed the idea.

Blackburn said that is not so.

Abrams, he reported, listened to the briefing, received the request for the accompanying air support that Clay's men would have to give, and then said: "You certainly seem to have thought of everything."

Only a few days before the mission, the raiders were moved from Eglin to Thailand. At that point they still did not know they were going to penetrate so deeply into North Vietnam.

"Simons told them just a few hours before they took off," Blackburn said, "and they all stood up and cheered."

On Nov. 18, Mr. Nixon discussed the forthcoming raid with Laird, Moorer, Kissinger and William P. Rogers, secretary of state. Only Rogers and U. Alexis Johnson, undersecretary of state for political affairs, from the State Department knew about the plan.

How, when or why Rogers and Johnson were told is not known. Blackburn said the planners deliberately tried to cut out civilian agencies of government for security's sake—not because they were not trusted, but just to be extra careful.

ADVISERS KEPT IN DARK

On Nov. 19, at a regular meeting of the National Security Council, Mr. Nixon apparently decided to keep even those most trusted advisers in the dark. Instead of telling them openly what would happen the next day, he slipped Laird a note saying that, regardless of the outcome, the operation had his wholehearted support.

The next day, Friday morning in Washington and Friday night in Southeast Asia, the troops were making ready to board their large, jet-powered HH-53 helicopters.

At bases in Thailand and on carriers at sea, the aircraft that would provide the cover and fly the diversionary strikes were ready to go. And at still other air bases, about 250 American planes were getting ready to strike a massive bombing attack on targets in southern North Vietnam, allegedly in retaliation for the shooting down, the week before, of an American reconnaissance plane by the North Vietnamese.

At about the time Simons was briefing his men in Thailand, Mr. Nixon was in the White House reviewing a weather report from the field. It was satisfactory and, in a formality, he gave the final "go" signal.

The raid itself is history. As American planes flew the diversionary strikes over a wide area of North Vietnam from Hanoi to

China Sea, firing live missiles at radar sites as well as lighting dummy flares, the aiding party, protected by fighter planes, took its way down the upper Red River valley and zoomed in on Son Tay.

A chopper landed at 2:18 a.m. Saturday (mid-afternoon in Washington), and within five seconds, the first empty cell was entered.

Ivory Coast task force knew in an instant that the camp had been empty for some time—"probably three months" as Manor said later.

The raiders had a high-level audience half a world away. In the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon, a group of men clustered around a loudspeaker. Present were Laird, Blackburn, his deputy, Col. Edward E. Mayer, Moorer and the other member of the Joint Chiefs.

RUNNING ACCOUNT GIVEN

About 11 a.m. Friday in Washington, a 12,000-mile direct line had been opened from Manor's secret Ivory Coast headquarters in Southeast Asia to the command center in the Pentagon's basement. And on that line, Manor gave his superiors a running account of the mission from takeoff to touchdown at Son Tay, from expectation to disappointment, from the first "zero-zero" reports to the conclusion.

Manor thought those first reports from Son Tay were garbled and refused to believe them. He passed this disbelief on to Washington.

Moorer, at the command center, in turn gave periodic reports to the White House. It is uncertain whether he talked directly to the President, but most of his reports were believed made to Brig. Gen. Alexander Haig of Kissinger's staff.

A controversy developed over how closely Richard Helms, director of the CIA, or his organization was consulted on the raid, after The Times published the fact that he was not involved in the final consideration and Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, complained to Laird about this at a hearing.

Laird told the committee that he had advised Helms and consulted with him on the raid "four or five weeks" before it took place. (By that time, the training at Eglin was well under way.)

Later Laird told newsmen, "I well remember sitting in my office with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency as we waited for the helicopter to take off at Son Tay, as we waited for them to cross the border, as we waited for our first reports as to whether or not POWs had been rescued at Son Tay. I can well remember listening to the clock tick as we waited for those messages."

Actually, according to one source, Helms had gone to Laird's office on a different matter and Laird, after the first preliminary reports indicating no prisoners had been found at Son Tay, left the command center in disappointment, knowing no prisoners had been rescued, and went back to his office to meet Helms.

And so the clock ticked away on the Son Tay raid, leaving nothing to be done but to bring home all the commandos and decorate them for their heroism—and to explain the escape to the American people and the world.

What did it all mean?

"It certainly put the prisoner-of-war issue on the front pages," a senior military official commented. "Before the raid you could not get any interest at all in POWs and now everyone's talking about them."

POWS ON FRONT PAGES

POWs certainly are on the front pages now. But whether that will help in securing their release is problematic. One can argue that Hanoi will respond to such pressure only by making the prisoners a more important bargaining counter in any negotiation to end the war.

"It showed Hanoi that no part of its territory was invulnerable to American attack," another senior military officer said.

However, it also revealed to Hanoi that American intelligence on what's going on in the north is so poor that, even with the most careful planning and coordination and most masterful execution, American military operations in the north cannot achieve their goals.

It showed the wives of the prisoners and the prisoners themselves that we care, and that will boost morale, Laird has said.

The wives have, for the time being, been assuaged. No one can say, however, whether the prisoners have been given new hope. Most of the nine American prisoners who have been released so far say North Vietnamese security is so tight in the prisons that the Americans there still know nothing of the abortive rescue attempt.

LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is only proper, considering the pride we all have of our own Nation as a symbol of freedom and justice, that we commemorate the 53d anniversary of Lithuanian independence.

Lithuanians have had a long and rich history in their continuing struggle for freedom and independence. It was just a half century ago that the courage and determination of the Lithuanian people were rewarded with the establishment of independence for their homeland. This achievement was realized after many years of suffering at great human costs—both in terms of body and spirit. Once having achieved independence, Lithuanians set up a constitutional government, a model of democratic ideals. Freedom of speech, assembly, and religion were the foundations of free Lithuania. Yet, in only a few short years, the hard-won freedom of the Lithuanian people was brutally snuffed out by the Stalinist government of the Soviet Union. In the 26 years since the end of World War II, Lithuania has remained an imprisoned state, a satellite of the Soviet Government.

We must all recognize, Mr. President, that it is indeed a credit to the courageous Lithuanian people, that after all these years they have maintained their freedom in mind and spirit. The continued determination of Lithuanians to win back their freedom and independence is an example for the entire world, an inspiring torch lighting the way for all men in the unending struggle for the freedom and the natural rights with which every man has been endowed.

Today, all Americans join in the continuing hope and determination of the Lithuanian people that someday soon freedom and independence for Lithuania will be more than the echo of an eternal dream; that the dream will become a long deserved reality.

SENATOR SCHWEIKER SUPPORTS DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, it is a privilege for me again this year to join the distinguished majority leader (Mr. MANSFIELD), the distinguished Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), and many other Senators, in cosponsoring Senate

Joint Resolution 1, proposing a constitutional amendment to provide for the direct election of the President and Vice President.

Last year, I testified before Senator BAYH's Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments in favor of the proposed constitutional amendment, and I was gratified with the thoroughness and dispatch with which this subcommittee and the entire Judiciary Committee were able to report it to the Senate for full consideration. Unfortunately, through the use of the Senate filibuster, we were unable to follow the Members of the other body and bring this proposal to a vote. Thus it is heartening to see that the momentum will be maintained this year.

In my testimony last year I stated my beliefs, which I still strongly maintain, that, first, a national President should be selected by the direct will of the people of our Nation, that, second, it is imperative for us to change the current electoral college system to eliminate the possibility, which currently exists, of a candidate winning the popular election but losing the electoral college vote, and, that, third, there is a need to increase the sense of personal participation by the voters in their role in selecting the President of the United States.

There is one new factor in our national electoral system which, I believe, adds even more weight to these three considerations: the lowering of the voting age to 18 in Federal elections. Not only are there more voters who now will participate in selecting the President, but there will be thousands of new voters who will want their individual vote to directly influence the outcome of the presidential election.

The fact remains that under the existing electoral college unit rule, whereby the plurality winner in a State receives all the electoral votes of that State each voter who casts a ballot for someone other than the plurality winner is, in effect, disfranchised. Although the proportional plan, whereby the States' electoral votes are cast in proportion to the number of votes each candidate receives in the election, and the district plan, whereby the electoral vote of each congressional district is given to the plurality winner in that district, are both improvements over the current unit rule, I feel strongly that if we are going to reform our system, we ought to take the full step necessary.

I cannot stress enough that the electoral college concept was created in an era when travel and communications were in their infancy and when such a representative system was the only feasible way to insure that the will of the people was being exercised. But today, when Presidents can instantly travel to any section of the country and when the modern media allow a President to have an instant national constituency, the need for a two-stage election is removed. The people of a congressional district directly elect their Representative; the people of a State directly elect their Senators and Governor; the same logic that resulted in our Founding Fathers instituting these systems dictates, in my view, that the people of our Nation

February 11, 1971

should likewise be able to directly elect their President.

The joint resolution has been changed since it was originally introduced last year, and I commend the sponsors of the resolution for making a number of important improvements and for building upon the experience of last year's debate to create a stronger measure, which I hope will have a better chance for speedy passage.

First of all, providing for an automatic formula as a substitute for an actual runoff election, in case no one candidate receives 40 percent or more of the popular vote, is a constructive change. Under the revised amendment, the candidate who receives the largest vote, but who does not receive 40 percent of the popular vote, is still the winning candidate if he would have had a majority under the electoral college system.

An important factor of this alternative tabulation is that it does not apply to a candidate who has received less than a plurality of the popular vote, and thus the electoral college formula cannot be applied to give the Presidency to a candidate who came in second in the popular vote.

A second important factor in this runoff provision is that the electoral votes of each State are applied automatically, eliminating any "deals" or maneuvering between candidates.

I feel this formula for a runoff is a significant step toward meeting the objections of critics of the direct election system, who feared chaos from the situation where a candidate did not receive a clear majority of the vote. The combination of a plurality of the popular vote, and a majority of the States, can help insure that the President-elect is truly the choice of the majority of the people in our Nation.

In addition, this resolution has been strengthened this year by changing the system by which a President is chosen by the Congress when there is no clear winner in the popular vote or electoral college runoff formula. Rather than having the choice made in the House of Representatives alone, utilizing a unit system by States, the final determination will be made by all Senators and Representatives, in joint session, voting individually. I support this change.

Finally, the resolution is improved by providing for the elimination of some of the most glaring inadequacies of the electoral college, in case the direct election proposal has been ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the States, but has not taken effect at the time of a presidential election. By binding each elector of the electoral college, the "faithless elector" problem is eliminated. And also, even with an electoral college system, in this interim situation, a failure to obtain an electoral college majority would result in the election of the President by a joint session of Congress, with each Senator and Representative voting separately.

Mr. President, all elected officials must do everything in their ability to restore the confidence of the public in our governmental institutions, and to make our electoral process fair and representative

of the will of the people. In my judgment, there is no step which can do more to accomplish this than eliminating the archaic institution of the electoral college and approving the direct election of the President. The issue has been thoroughly studied and debated in recent years. Now is the time for action.

THE GREEK MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, for a long time I have been concerned with our policy toward the Greek military dictatorship, which in fact negates both the spirit and the objectives of the Truman Doctrine of 1947. That is why today I would like to bring to the attention of the Senate two very interesting and useful documents which I do hope President Nixon and his foreign policy advisers will have a chance to study: First, an article written by the well-known syndicated columnist Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, published in the Washington Post of January 31, 1971, concerning the tragic but also most revealing Elias P. Demetripoulos affair. Second, a statement addressed to the North Atlantic Assembly signed by 21 distinguished former Greek cabinet ministers, both conservatives and liberals, and representing a very wide spectrum of the political life of Greece, which was brought to my attention by my good friend, Elias P. Demetripoulos, a leader of the Greek resistance movement.

I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATOR FULBRIGHT VERSUS THE JUNTA

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

Political reaction here against the dictatorial military regime in Greece has reached such a peak that Sen. J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is quietly sending two committee investigators to Athens for an on-the-spot probe of how U.S. policy is being carried out.

What has moved Fulbright and other committee members is accumulating evidence that the military junta shows no intention of keeping its agreement with President Nixon of last Sept. 22. On that date, Mr. Nixon decided to resume full-scale arms shipments to Greece—a clear signal that the junta had worked itself back into the good graces of the United States. In return, the junta pledged political reforms, including release of political prisoners and a move toward democratic elections.

That end of the bargain is not being kept. Moreover, there is deepening suspicion on Capitol Hill that U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasea is too close to the colonels.

To make the committee's investigation, Fulbright has assigned two top investigators—Richard Moose and James Lowenstein, both ex-Foreign Service officers. They will proceed to Athens in the first on-the-spot congressional inquiry since the military dictatorship took power in a bloodless coup d'etat almost four years ago. Their last assignment was U.S. policy in Cambodia.

Although Fulbright has been brooding about the junta for many months, the recent tragedy involving the leading anti-junta Greek exile, Elias Demetripoulos, played a significant part in the decision to dispatch Moose and Lowenstein.

Despite direct intervention of the State Department, Demetripoulos was unable to obtain an advance safe-conduct pledge from the junta to visit his dying father in December. One result of that was a letter to Fulbright from three U.S. senators suggesting that Tasea be summoned to Washington for testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee.

Fulbright's response to the three Democrats—Sens. Frank Moss of Utah, Mike Gravel of Alaska and Quentin Burdick of North Dakota—stated that "the nature and conduct of U.S. relations with the junta have long been a source of consternation to me." He said that the Demetripoulos incident "is similar to many others in the past few years."

Fulbright's subsequent decision for a committee probe in Athens carries the most serious implications for the junta and its souring relations with the Nixon administration.

MILLS' ALTERNATIVE

Despite veiled threats of retaliation against congressmen who oppose President Nixon's \$5 billion revenue-sharing proposal, the political prognosis today is that the plan will die a slow and (in Congress) unlamented death.

The veiled threats, emanating from administration backers, hint that recalcitrant members of Congress may get redistricted by angry state legislatures into new and unfriendly districts. Almost all congressmen will be vulnerable to redistricting this year or next to take account of the 1970 census.

But the chance of that actually happening is zero. In fact, even if proponents of the plan could prove that it will happen, the opposition of both Rep. Willbur Mills of Arkansas, powerful chairman of the Ways and Means Committee that will handle the President's general revenue-sharing plan, and Rep. John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, ranking Republican member, assures the plan's defeat in the House.

Moreover, intimates of Mills predict that he is moving toward a substitute plan that would have roughly the same result as Mr. Nixon's general revenue-sharing proposal: gradual federalizing of the welfare program, with Uncle Sam picking up most or all the state welfare bill, now running at \$7.3 billion a year.

Some governors have been lobbying for just such a change for years. Switching from the present welfare program to Mr. Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, passed by the House but not the Senate last year, would cost the federal government an estimated \$4 billion extra in the first year—but would not reduce state welfare costs more than \$600 million.

A footnote: The President's "special" revenue-sharing plan—grouping present and narrow categorical grant programs into six broad functions such as education and transportation—has a far better prospect in Congress. I will not go to the Ways and Means Committee.

STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY (THE HAGUE, 1970)

BY 21 FORMER GREEK MINISTERS

1. The undersigned Greek parliamentarians, residents of Athens, who have been ministers of Greek governments in the last ten years, address themselves to the parliamentarians of the NATO Assembly and invoke, on the occasion of the 1970 meeting in The Hague, their moral support in the pursuit of the implementation in Greece—a member of the Atlantic Alliance since 1952—of the objectives proclaimed in the preamble of the Treaty, namely the defence of Democracy, Freedom and Human dignity, which were all dismantled in Greece on 21 April 1967 by a coup of a small group of ambitious army officers who, under the pretext of a communist revolution, turned against the King, the then legal government and the ex-

THE EVENING STAR

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POW CAMP RAID

Son Tay Data Was 6 Months Old

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The Star

The White House relied on basic military intelligence that was at least six months old in approving the unsuccessful commando raid in November on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp inside North Vietnam.

Interviews over the past two months revealed that the Pentagon's first information about the Son Tay camp—23 miles west of Hanoi—was supplied by a former North Vietnamese

prison guard who was captured during the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970.

The guard, whose capture was considered highly classified information, provided military intelligence teams with invaluable information about the location, operation and construction of the Son Tay prison. The detailed information even included what kind of locks were on the cell doors and where they were located.

By July, the interrogation of the prison guard had been completed and the Air Force was ordered to initiate a series of aerial overflights over the Son Tay prison. At no time before the actual invasion of the prison—on Nov. 20, six months after the guard's capture—was the military able to establish any further proof that Americans were, in fact, being detained inside Son Tay.

In essence, the high-risk operation was staged—with approval

from President Nixon—although the only facts known were those supplied by the former prison camp guard.

Yet, there was no available evidence indicating that the military planners "knew" that the Son Tay camp did not contain prisoners, as Sen. J. W. Fulbright, of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has publicly charged.

What does emerge from an
See SON TAY Page A-4

Continued From Page A-1
intensive investigation into the Son Tay raid is a serious indictment of the practices and operation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which was in charge of intelligence for the mission.

The DIA's photo analysts somehow interpreted what turned out to be a vegetable garden growing inside the Son Tay compound as evidence that American prisoners were inside the area.

Here is the story of the planning behind the Son Tay operation:

The capture—or defection—of the North Vietnamese prison camp guard in May, 1970, was a major achievement; such men were never sent by Hanoi into South Vietnam because of the higher risk of capture. At least three POW camps previously were known to exist inside the city limits of Hanoi, but the location of other facilities was not known. Despite this, the military had long been seeking permission to raid one of the known camps.

Clue to Inadequacy

One clue to the inadequacy of the over-all American intelligence operation inside North Vietnam emerged from the fact that the Pentagon learned about the Son Tay camp from the captured guard. Son Tay area had, in fact, long been known to the intelligence community and frequently photographed.

According to defense sources, a major military construction program, manned by a force of an estimated 15,000 Chinese Communists, got under way there in

ed, the geography changed again—much to everyone's relief—and the courtyard suddenly took on "that well-worn look," as one analyst described it.

By now it was August and the White House was approached. Briefings were presented to President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security affairs. The President was, according to later White House accounts, "enthusiastic" about the idea and authorized full-scale planning and training for a search and rescue mission.

The cloak-and-dagger operation was code-named the Joint Contingency Task Group Ivory Coast, and training began in August at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Optimism was rising inside the government; it was the first time that the military had established an intelligence "book" on a POW camp not inside the Hanoi city limits.

But there were many basic intelligence problems that were never overcome. For one thing, no one had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Son Tay prison was holding Americans.

"We had a hypothesis based on various sources of information," said one analyst who worked on the project, "but as far as being able to say, 'Hey, there go two more guys into the camp'—well, we couldn't." The official added:

"Our situation was this—so a river comes out and floods—and so they (the North Vietnamese) move the pilots out. The place overgrows. It looks bad. Bingo. The grass starts to wear

1965 or 1966. The area also became the site of a MIG base early in the air war and was a key target area during the heavy bombings from 1965 through November 1968.

The Central Intelligence Agency also had been unable to develop any solid information about prisoner-of-war camps. Beginning in the mid-1960s, it had attempted unsuccessfully to infiltrate highly trained teams of South Vietnamese into North Vietnam.

Most of the groups—known in the intelligence community as "Bell Teams"—were dropped by parachute in the Red River Delta, northwest of Hanoi, but quickly became, as a former agent said, "ground up like hamburger. They'd get wrapped up in two or three days," he added, largely due to the high state of internal security in the North.

In July 1970, the military asked the Central Intelligence Agency for any information it had on the physical makeup of Son Tay, but that apparently was the extent of the CIA's involvement.

The raid on Son Tay was to be an all-military affair, with over-all direction and planning from the Pentagon's counter-insurgency office and intelligence from photo interpretation supplied by CIA.

Early Photographs

The early reconnaissance photographs of the prison camp indicated that it was still in heavy use and were highly encouraging to the men in the Pentagon. A highly skilled team was carefully assembled; men were hand-picked from offices throughout the Pentagon and assigned to the secret operation.

The planning was rigidly bureaucratized for security reasons: One group of men worked on means for getting the rescue team safely in and out of North Vietnam; another group did the day-by-day analysis to determine a crucial fact—were the pilots there?

The evidence that the photo interpreters viewed as encouraging, however, was far from definite proof that the captured pilots were at Son Tay.

One man who worked on the Son Tay project, attempting to explain its failure, argued that photo reconnaissance is not an exact science at all despite widespread beliefs of the general public so conditioned to descriptions of miraculous close-ups from "eye in the sky" cameras 100 miles up. The source added:

"Take that photograph of the

down again. Hey, it looks good. It's a 50-50 chance they moved them back."

There were, apparently, only a few cautious doubts raised — largely because the high secrecy of the operation kept details away from many officials who might have pointed out more vigorously the fact that the military was planning a high-risk raid on the basis of evidence indicating that weeds and grass had been trampled.

Previous Mistakes

There had been previous mistakes based on aerial photographs.

One former intelligence official recalled the time that photo interpreters spotted an enclosed camp area in North Vietnam with a double barbed wire fence. After observing it for a while, they concluded it was a base with some military significance and targeted it for a bombing raid.

"A few days later," the official said, "North Vietnam began claiming we had bombed the death ward of a leper colony. Intelligence got fooled."

The 101-man joint Air Force-Army commando team took off in helicopters from its base in Thailand early on Nov. 20. According to many published accounts, the team arrived undetected and landed inside the small Son Tay compound. No prisoners were found, but the men noticed that most of the open space inside the prison was being used by the North Vietnamese for a carefully cultivated vegetable garden.

'Well-Worn' Garden

Intelligence analysts later concluded during post mortems on the raid that the "Well-worn look," which had become so clearly discernible after the July-August flooding, might have been a result of the gardening efforts.

More disturbing was the possibility that the prisoners could have been transferred from Son Tay in August, just after the flooding began and just as the commando team began its arduous training for a mission already doomed.

During a little-noticed news conference at Eglin Air Force Base in early December, Brig. Gen. LeRoy Manor, head of the commando team, told newsmen: "We weren't able to tell exactly when they moved the prisoners of war . . . I say it could have been about three months. And this is a judgment, and I have nothing absolutely definite to

crowd on the eclipse during the March on Washington (the anti-war demonstration in November, 1969) — it was an Air Force picture published in a lot of newspapers. Now, don't ask anybody to break down how many of the people were Negroes and how many were Caucasians. We just can't do it. But after they left, you sure could tell that they were there—the grass would be all trampled."

A similarly trampled appearance was evident in what seemed to be a grassy area inside the tiny Son Tay compound.

Shock For Military

The aerial photographs also established that the guard towers and basic layout of Son Tay were very similar in design to that of the POW camps inside Hanoi. It was agreed—without ever seeing an identifiable prisoner—that the Son Tay facility was an active POW camp for Americans.

Sometime in the July-August period, the military got a shock when, during a period of heavy flooding of the Red River Delta, the camp suddenly was vacated. The changing geography of the camp was apparent: the trampled look disappeared.

When the flood waters reced-

base this on."

In fact, the Pentagon had no way of knowing if American prisoners had been inside the camp at all — even before the flooding — since the captured guard last work there early in 1970.

Intelligence men in the Pentagon later were able only to conclude that the base had either been closed permanently or temporarily. "Was it being refurbished? Was it being disinfected? We didn't know," said one of the men who took part in the planning.

The Vietnamese guards in the camp had AK-47 automatic rifles, the standard Chinese weapon not usually given to local troops in North Vietnam, a fact that led many analysts to decide that they were a small house-keeping team, perhaps waiting for the prisoners to return.

The last overflight of the prison, concluded just hours before the operation began, still showed signs of occupation — the "well-worn look."

Despite the failure, most member of the planning and intelligence teams took solace in the demonstrated ability of American commandoes to penetrate North Vietnam's air space

Nixon Sending British Expert on New Saigon Study

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 — President Nixon is sending Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, back to South Vietnam next month for an urgent evaluation of the Saigon Government's police and public safety programs, State Department officials said today.

Other Administration informants said that the British expert would also look into the joint American-South Vietnamese police and pacification activities, which range from efforts to wipe out the Communist political organization in the South to operation of South Vietnamese prisons with United States assistance.

State Department officials said that the proposal for Sir Robert to accept another mission in South Vietnam was made by the Saigon Government with the concurrence of the United States.

They said the request was forwarded by Ellsworth T. Bunker, the American Ambassador in Saigon, in a message to President Nixon earlier this month.

Sir Robert undertook a five-week secret mission for President Nixon last autumn — his

second visit to South Vietnam in a year—but it was not clear for what specific reasons he and his group of British police specialists had been asked to go back after so short an interval.

There was strict secrecy here surrounding Sir Robert's trip. But the speculation in informed quarters is that both Mr. Bunker and the Administration were eager to have an up-to-date independent evaluation of the progress of pacification and related public safety efforts. It is felt such an evaluation is needed before decisions are made on additional withdrawals of American troops from South Vietnam.

Another possible reason for the mission is that the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, which is in over-all charge of pacification, is to be reorganized, effective March 1, as the Community Defense and Local Development Program.

Other informed sources said that both the Administration and Ambassador Bunker still appeared to be troubled by the relative lack of success in the destruction of the secret Communist network in South Vietnam. This has a bearing on the larger aspects of pacification and on the Vietnamization pro-

gram, under which South Vietnamese forces are gradually replacing American combat units.

The problem of the Communist organization in South Vietnam was reportedly a principal theme of the report Sir Robert presented to President Nixon at a secret conference last Oct. 13.

The New York Times last Dec. 2 reported that Sir Robert had gone to South Vietnam on a Presidential mission. The Times article said Administration officials had asserted that his report underlined the failure to eradicate the Communist network.

The next day, however, in confirming the existence of the Thompson report, the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that "the overall thrust of the [New York Times] story, which leads to the impression that the pacification and Vietnamization programs are not doing well, is an incorrect impression."

Mr. Ziegler refused to describe the content of the report on security grounds. In an interview with the Associated Press last Dec. 13, Sir Robert declined to comment specifically on that part of the Times article that dealt with

the failure to destroy the Communist subversive organization. He said, however, that the Vietnamization and pacification policies were "unassailable by the enemy."

In mid-December Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird summoned to Washington the head of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, William E. Colby, to discuss the pacification problems. According to Administration informants, this review included questions about the Communist network raised in the Thompson report.

Officials here said today that Sir Robert's new mission would deal with United States and South Vietnamese "police and public safety" programs.

This appeared to suggest that Sir Robert and his advisers—who were not identified—would concentrate on pacification and, particularly, on the problems of the Communist underground.

The allied program to eradicate this organization is run jointly under the name of Operation Phoenix by the Civil Operations and Rural Development Program and the South Vietnamese National Police Directorate. Although the Civil Operations group is headed by a civilian, Ambassador Colby, most of its personnel engaged in Operation Phoenix is drawn from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Officials indicated, however, that the Thompson mission would concern itself with other phases of the American and South Vietnamese police and public safety programs.

Both the National Police Directorate and the South Vietnamese prison system are advised and supported by the Public Safety Office of the Administration for International Developmental under over-all direction of Ambassador Colby's group.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, March 22, 1971 D11

Scant Data Cramps Paris Negotiators

By Jack Anderson

Our negotiators in Paris have been restricted to the most routine intelligence about the war they are supposed to be settling. This has led to some grumping inside the delegation over the difficulty of negotiating in the dark.

The Paris delegation receives only a routine intelligence brief dealing with the Vietnam war. The top-secret battle plans, position papers, contingency plans and policymaking documents—

sent to Paris.

The air strikes at missile sites, antiaircraft emplacements and other tactical targets in North Vietnam in late November, for example, caught Ambassador David K. Bruce completely by surprise. He received his first word of the attacks from the North Vietnamese.

This left him poorly prepared to handle the North Vietnamese delegation's protests in Paris. The Communist negotiators let loose a propaganda blast, threatening to stonewall the talks.

Ambassador Bruce asked urgently for more details about

the raids. He needed the background information to help him respond to the Communist charges.

His request was forwarded by his military liaison man, Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell, in a "flash" message to the Pentagon.

Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Joint Chiefs chairman, sent back a detailed account of the raids from the Washington Post. The reply was regarded in Paris as an insulting message to Bruce that he should be satisfied with what he reads in the newspapers.

Poet's New Quest

Beat poet Allen Ginsberg, the unhappy hippie, has embarked upon the new role of investigative reporter in pursuit of evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency is supporting the opium racket in Laos.

Ginsberg, sandalled and balding, his long beard streaked with white hairs, has even managed to interview the exclusive CIA director, Richard Helms, about the CIA's suspected opium smuggling.

Helms vigorously denied his agents are flying opium out of Laos. But Ginsberg has collected a thick packet of con-

trary evidence from ex-CIA men, State Department informants and classified U.N. documents.

The poet's theory is that the CIA has been compelled to help the opium farmers in the mountains of Northern Laos in order to keep them fighting the Communists.

The CIA has raised a 10,000-man army from these Meo tribesmen. Without their opium trade, they might require massive U.S. economic aid.

Informants have told Ginsberg that the renegade Chinese Nationalists in Northern Laos and Thailand also make their living from opium. The CIA would like to keep these Chinese active, too, against the Communists.

Poet's Transformation

We discovered Ginsberg's transformation from poet to muckraker when he came to our office, clad in his hippie garb, seeking proof of his own opium story. To our surprise, his detailed files and probing questions were thoroughly professional.

He asked us for a copy of a letter that has disappeared from the files of Senate Government Operations Subcom-

mittee. The letter, written by a former CIA employee named S. M. Mustard, charges that South Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky once flew opium out of Laos.

The New York Times and Ramparts magazine, which are also working on the opium story, had called us about the letter. But Ginsberg came to our office and pressed in person for the missing evidence.

We dug a photostat of the letter, addressed to former Sen. Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska) out of our files. It told how Ky, during his missions as an Air Force colonel, "took advantage of this situation to fly opium from Laos to Saigon."

My associate, Les Whitten, verified several details in the letter but could come up with no additional evidence that Ky engaged in opium smuggling. The colorful South Vietnamese Vice President also denied the charge.

But the ragged, bearded Ginsberg tucked a copy of the letter into his impressive portfolio and strode off for an interview with Walter Pincus, a former Senate Foreign Relations investigator with inside information on Indochina.

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nerable to observation by other intelligence means at our disposal."

The Administration's sensitivity in public discussion of advances in seismic research was illustrated by the fact that the Pentagon, according to Senator Case, "ripped out" a section summarizing the findings on the Woods Hole conference from a report submitted to the Senator.

As a result, Senator Case said, he turned to "nationally recognized authorities," many of whom participated in the conference, for a summary of the findings.

In their summary, they said, "The essence of these findings is that there are two significant developments which make it much more feasible to distinguish between seismic disturbances caused by earthquakes and those caused by nuclear explosions.

"One of the developments noted was that new technology has revealed that explosions cause much smaller waves in the earth's crust than do earthquakes. A complementary and equally important finding is the ability to detect smaller seismic disturbances than had heretofore been possible."

THE WHALING INDUSTRY

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, many people today believe that the whaling business disappeared with the sailing ship. This view is entirely wrong and unfortunately is a tragic misconception. The whaling industry has continued at such a pace that whales are now, and have been for some period of time, an endangered species.

During the 1960's the total number of whales killed was the greatest 10-year kill ever made. In 1933 almost 29,000 whales were killed, yielding 2,606,201 barrels of oil. In 1966 almost 58,000 whales were killed, yielding 1,546,904 barrels of oil. While almost twice as many whales were killed in 1966 as in 1933, only half as much oil was gathered, which obviously means that whale hunters are killing smaller whales in larger numbers.

Scientists have predicted that main herds of whales have been brought to near extinction in the Antarctic. They have further predicted that if a 5-year moratorium on whaling had been established in the Antarctic between 1962 and 1967, the industry could have been harvesting the maximum sustainable yield from 1967 onward. But a moratorium was not established and it is now estimated that it will take 50 to 100 years to bring back the Antarctic whale stocks to the same size that they might have reached between 1962 and 1967.

In March of this year Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans announced that he had ordered an end to American participation in the destruction of the great mammals. However, despite the general recognition that all species of whales are endangered, Secretary Stans has now backtracked and issued a license to Del-Monte Fishing Co. of Richmond, a California firm, permitting the firm to engage in the 6-month season on fin-back whales and the 8-month season on Sei and Sperm whales. The season began on April 1.

This is indeed a disappointing development and I believe places in question the ability of this administration to handle the discretionary powers of the Endangered Species Act.

On March 23 I introduced S. 1315, a bill that would prohibit Americans killing ocean mammals, including seals,

walrus, polar bears, as well as whales. Even though the total U.S. kill of whales in 1970 came to only 125, the United States lost the opportunity this year to lead all other nations in stopping the killing of this endangered species. Other countries killed over 20,000 whales in 1970 and it is quite obvious that the protection of whales cannot be achieved unilaterally, and that Russia, Japan, and Norway, the major whalers, must join in the endeavor. My bill attempts to reach this problem by requiring the State Department to initiate an international treaty halting the slaughter of ocean mammals. Also my bill would help to remove the economic incentive for these other countries to continue the needless slaughter of ocean mammals by banning the importation of all products of these animals.

Last month while in Eastern Europe meeting with officials on East-West trade, I met with high ranking Russian officials in the Ministry of Fisheries on the problems associated with the killing of ocean mammals and the proposals in my bill. They agreed that public opinion requires more effective measures against taking ocean mammals. They also informed me that their ideas and the ideas in my bill had much in common; however, they were insistent that any measure in this area must have the adherence of all concerned nations. The Russians have taken the lead in protecting the polar bear since 1956.

I believe that it is essential that immediate hearings be held on S. 1315, which is cosponsored by 24 other Senators and which has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman David Pryor, Democrat of Arkansas, and is cosponsored by 20 House Members. Stronger action than that taken by Secretary Stans is certainly called for in view of the growing threat of extinction of all ocean mammals.

UN.

THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, on May 13, Robert Shaplen, one of the most experienced and perceptive observers of the war in Indochina, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Because I agree completely with Mr. Shaplen that "the Vietnam war, always essentially a political one, is rapidly becoming more political"; that "we do not understand much about the Vietnamese"; and that we should stay out of the process of accommodation through which the Vietnamese must work out their political differences, I have introduced a Resolution creating a congressional commission to implement a policy of strict U.S. neutrality in the coming South Vietnamese elections.

The purpose of this Commission is not to tell the South Vietnamese how to run their elections, but to keep us out of those elections. Mr. Shaplen has pointed out that many South Vietnamese believe that the United States is backing the Thieu government "to the hilt." Unless we act to dispel that impression, we will once again have interfered with a political event that is best left to the South Vietnamese themselves.

I find Mr. Shaplen's testimony to be a

most constructive addition to the debate over the future course of our Indochina policy, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SHAPLEN, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 13, 1971

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: I wish to thank you for your invitation to testify at these hearings. I have been a member of *The New Yorker* staff since 1952 and the Far Eastern correspondent of the magazine for the past nine years, but I am appearing here today on a private basis. My experience in China and Southeast Asia dates back to 1945. My first visit to South Vietnam was in June 1946. I was there most recently, and in Laos and Cambodia, in March and April of this year. I am the author of *The Lost Revolution, Time out of Hand, and The Road From War*.

I shall address myself first to the Vietnam war, specifically to the subject of these hearings—how to end it—and then to the problems of Southeast Asia in general. Ending the war as soon as possible is only a necessary first step to dealing with the vital question of re-formulating our whole foreign policy-making process, not only with regard to Asia but to the rest of the world as well.

My own position on the Vietnam war has been as follows: I believed in the original Vietnam commitment, and while I think we have made many disastrous mistakes since we became involved in that area—going back to 1945–46 but particularly since 1954—I still feel we had a legitimate initial political concern. But that concern should have been limited, in its expression and implementation, to a military assistance and advisory program, stressing unconventional rather than conventional warfare methods, and to programs of economic and social aid. The continuation of these programs, collectively, should have been predicated on the amount and substance of political and social reform the Vietnamese undertook. Unfortunately, we set no such standards and went ahead anyway, and once involved it was difficult to avoid becoming more involved. Hindsight criticism is easy, but this was our first big mistake.

I was against the bombing of North Vietnam and the overcommitment of American forces in the South. It is probably true, however, that had it not been for the number of American troops in the country in 1965 and 1966 it would have been cut in two, from the highlands across to the coast, and most of the northern half of South Vietnam would have fallen to the Communists. But after that, strategically and tactically, we continued to rely far too much on firepower and airpower, including indiscriminate bombing. If we helped save a series of unpopular governments, we increasingly alienated millions of South Vietnamese by our overpowering but invariably ineffective or inconclusive military actions, despite the fact that we killed several hundred thousand North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Simultaneously, we tried to ameliorate the destruction we caused by constantly shifting programs of so-called pacification. Real social and economic reform, including land reform, should have been far better conceived and implemented far sooner. Most important, the task of training the Vietnamese to fight alone, with modern weapons including M-16 rifles, should have been undertaken immediately after the military crisis of 1955–56, not several years later, as happened, after the 1968 Tet offensive. Nowadays, our belated efforts to bring about improvements in security and development, and to turn the war over to Vietnamese, are all part of what we call Vietnamization. Because of the heritage of

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none to Latin America, critics consider the flame is not worth the candle.

NEW FLOW POSSIBLE

It is possible that the winding down of the Vietnam war may produce new flows of arms to Latin America. Certainly many Latin nations have demonstrated that they will buy arms elsewhere if they cannot get them from the U.S. But this has not happened yet and it may never happen.

What of the defense of the Panama Canal and of the hemisphere in general? CINCSOUTH has no role in the canal defense. The small infantry units in the Canal Zone do not need a Joint Staff to supervise them and the brigade would not be affected by departure of the Southern Command. Air defense is handled by Strike Command in the U.S. and there are no combat aircraft stationed in Panama. The Navy command for defense of the region is in Puerto Rico.

Similarly the training centers for Latin officers and men would not be affected by terminating the role of the CINCSOUTH staff. These could continue functioning without the generals and admirals and so could the procedure of sending Latin officers to school in the United States.

The armed forces have waged a strong battle to keep their Southern Command headquarters intact and have cut the milgroups to half the strength of three years ago. But it now appears that even though some of the structure may remain, the unwieldy head is doomed to go for much the same reasons that the cavalry finally got rid of horses.

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORTS GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, The Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights and Genocide Treaties has worked long and hard in the fight to get the United States to ratify the United Nations human rights and genocide treaties. I am very pleased to be working with and supported by such a fine organization. Betty Kaye Taylor, executive secretary of the committee, wrote a letter which was published in the New York Times Magazine on Sunday, May 2, supporting my efforts to get this country to ratify these vital treaties.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter and a correction, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENOCIDE TREATIES,
New York, N.Y., May 11, 1971.

Senator WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Thank you for your letter of May 7th indicating that Martin H. Webster's letter about the Beverly Hills Bar Association plebiscite had been placed in the *Congressional Record*. I was, of course, delighted to see this.

I trust that you've already seen my letter in the *New York Times Magazine* Section of May 2nd applauding your efforts on behalf of the Genocide Convention. I regret that the *Times* failed to correct the figure I submitted on the number of times you had spoken on the Human Rights Conventions. I called in a correction as soon as this mistake was brought to my attention but the *Times* failed to take note of it. I hope we get the Treaty ratified before this "erratum" becomes fact.

Sincerely,

BETTY KAYE TAYLOR,
Executive Secretary.

RE: PROXMIRE'S STUBBORNNESS

TO THE EDITOR:

John Herber's fine article on Senator William Proxmire ("What Makes Proxmire Run," April 4) failed to mention one other outstanding example of the Senator's reliance "on the power of argument."

On Jan. 11, 1967, Senator Proxmire served notice that he would remind the Senate daily of its failure to approve U.S. ratification of several U.N. human-rights treaties, notably the Genocide Convention. Since making that pledge, he has spoken 5,520 times. And now, after 20 years of delay, the Foreign Relations Committee voted recently to send the Genocide Treaty to the Senate for consent to ratify.

"More obdurate, more obstinate, more stubborn"—yes! And right on!

BETTY KAYE TAYLOR,
Executive Secretary.

ATOM TESTS NOW IDENTIFIABLE

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, scientists can now discriminate between earthquakes and the smallest nuclear tests conducted underground by the two super nuclear powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R. This important breakthrough was discussed last summer in a special meeting sponsored by the Department of Defense at Woods Hole, Mass.

Identifying atomic tests removes one of the last obstacles to a ban on underground testing of nuclear weapons, and might very well lead to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. I have always favored such a treaty, but only when competent scientific opinion held that underground explosions could be identified. With that possibility now here, I earnestly hope that the United States will take the lead toward negotiating a comprehensive test ban. Such a treaty would be a boon to the people of America and of Russia as well as all of mankind.

I ask unanimous consent that a New York Times news story on this matter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CASE CITES GAINS IN TEST DETECTION

(By John W. Finney)

WASHINGTON, May 6.—Senator Clifford P. Case said today that scientists had made so much progress in distinguishing earthquakes from underground atomic explosions that it should now be possible for the United States to enter into a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests.

As the basis for his contention, the New Jersey Republican cited unpublished conclusions reached by seismic experts at a conference last summer at Woods Hole, Mass., sponsored by the Defense Department.

The conference, according to a summary made public by the Senator, concluded that the ability to identify seismic disturbances had been tremendously increased as a result of research during the nine years since the limited test ban treaty was agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The implication he drew from these conclusions was that the problem of monitoring underground nuclear tests had been solved to the point where the United States could consider entering into a comprehensive test ban.

Because of differences between the United States and the Soviet Union over the inspection required to check on underground explosions, the 1963 test ban treaty excluded

underground tests and was limited to explosions in the atmosphere, in space or under water.

On the basis of the reported improvement in detection and identification, Senator Case concluded that it should now be possible to monitor a ban on underground tests with two or three on-site inspections a year.

This, he noted, was the number offered at one point by the Soviet Union in the negotiations in 1962. The offer was rejected by the United States, which, on the ratio of one inspection for every 10 unidentified seismic events, demanded seven on-site inspections a year.

After the American rejection, the Soviet Union withdrew its offer. In recent years Moscow has taken the position that seismic advances now permit an underground test ban to be monitored wholly through national detection systems operated by each country.

The Nixon Administration continues to hold to the position of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations that on-site inspection is still necessary.

An official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said that there was "general agreement" that there had been "substantial improvement" in seismic detection but not enough to warrant a change in the American position.

Congressional pressure, however, now seems to be mounting on the Administration to re-examine the long dormant issue, which in recent years has been overshadowed by a preoccupation within the Government with the strategic-arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

At the Geneva disarmament conference, the United States and the Soviet Union are coming under similar pressures from the nonaligned states to re-examine their positions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The Case statement coincided with an announcement by Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine that the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament would hold hearings on various possible arms control steps, including a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Senator Muskie is the chairman of the subcommittee, and Senator Case is the ranking Republican.

FIRST DETAILS ON CONFERENCE

Senator Case's statement provided the first detailed disclosure of the results of the Woods Hole conference, called by the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency to review progress made in the seismic research program known as Project Vela. About \$300-million has been spent on the project since it was set up in 1963.

Senator Case said that "authoritative reports" he had received about the seven-day conference "indicate that our capacity to distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear explosions has improved 10-fold since 1963."

As a result, he said, the time has come for the Foreign Relations Committee to explore "whether a comprehensive test-ban treaty may now be possible."

According to Senator Case, the Woods Hole conference concluded that the annual number of unidentifiable seismic disturbances in the Soviet Union above 4.0 on the Richter earthquake scale has been reduced from about 75 in 1963 to 25 now.

A nuclear explosion producing 4.0 on the Richter scale corresponds to an explosion of one or two kilotons, equal to that of 1,000 to 2,000 tons of TNT, in granite.

In dry, porous soil, which tends to muffle the shock waves, 4.0 on the Richter scale would correspond to a 20-kiloton explosion—the size of the Hiroshima bomb.

But a summary of the Woods Hole conference presented to Senator Case pointed out that such desert-like soil "to the depth which is necessary, is rare in the Soviet Union and such testing would be very vul-

confusion and experimentation, Vietnamization remains a cloudy concept.

Politically, I think our efforts have also been ineffective and often damaging. We tried to force-feed the Vietnamese western-style democracy far too quickly, before their institutions were able to cope with it. We should have started creating the conditions for building traditional village democracy, horizontally from the ground up, instead of imposing a new system vertically, from the top down. It is partly for this reason, and because of the physical damage we have wrought, that the good we have done socially and economically has been more than offset by the bad. There is no political cohesion and not enough comprehension and motivation for social and economic changes to become sufficiently meaningful. This does not mean that we will leave Vietnam without some improvements and hopes for the future; but for what we put in we are coming out with very little, including scant knowledge of the mistakes we made. Few lessons have been learned.

Two major events of the past year, namely the invasion of the Cambodian sanctuaries and the incursion into Laos, have not contributed sufficient positive results to warrant the negative ones—of at this late juncture taking the initiative in further widening what has always been an Indochina war, long recognized by the Communists as such. Once we were over committed, we would have done far better to attack the sanctuaries and the Ho Chi Minh Trail area much earlier, in 1967 or 1968, perhaps even to have risked blockading the ports of Haiphong and Sihanoukville, instead of bombing the North. We thus fought the wrong kind of war in several ways. We have continued, all along to teach the South Vietnamese to fight a conventional war instead of a People's War of counter-insurgency. This is another reason I remain skeptical about the success of Vietnamization. The only real and practical solution in Vietnam is one of political accommodation. I shall come back to that later.

Your Committee is considering a number of bills and resolutions that deal both with the question of ending the war and avoiding overcommitments in the future, partly by limiting the prerogatives and powers of the President and re-affirming the obligations of Congress. There has been considerable debate about establishing cut-off dates—that is, dates for the total removal of all American forces in Vietnam. I can readily understand the overwhelming desire of the American people to get out of Vietnam as soon as possible. However, it is far easier to fall into a quagmire than to get out of one. It is not simply a question of prolonging the agony, ours and theirs. The basic question, even at this eleventh hour of our misbegotten involvement, is how to get out in such a way as to preserve whatever chance there may be for the Vietnamese to reach a political settlement among themselves without either permitting the Communists to take over the country or having the war continue indefinitely. The people of South Vietnam, for the most part, are eager to have us leave. But whatever the mistakes of the past, most of the Vietnamese, like most of the remaining Americans in Vietnam, also feel that the schedule of total withdrawal should and cannot be too precipitately advanced. Immoral and distasteful as the war has become, we cannot get out, lock, stock and barrel, overnight. It is not just a matter of admitting our lack of success gracefully, of atoning for disgraceful My Lai, or of cutting our losses. Beyond being physically impossible, overnight withdrawal would create complete chaos in Vietnam. It would drop our prestige in the rest of Asia, as well as elsewhere in the world, to a new low. Like it or not, we cannot escape amount of remnant responsibility, including the responsibility to repair as much of the damage we

have done as possible, both physical and social.

One may still ask, however, if the pace of withdrawal cannot be faster and if a reasonable cut-off date cannot now be set. While I have been critical of the Cambodia and Laos operations, I feel that, by and large, President Nixon's Withdrawal policy so far has been reasonable. But it can at this juncture be stepped up and it should be more clearly defined. Although the most elite forces in the Vietnamese army suffered severe losses in the Laos operation, seven of the eleven Vietnamese divisions are currently rated good or better by our top American military experts. Having been taught to fight the wrong way, they are at least now beginning to fight the wrong way right, that is to say, conventionally or quasi-conventionally. This may not be much but it is all we can do at this late date. Whether the Vietnamese can change later is up to them—certainly the vast majority of our military establishment has proved itself incapable of changing its theories and methods of indoctrination.

The President has recently announced another reduction of 100,000 men, bringing the total to 184,000 to be left in Vietnam by December 1st, 1971. He has continued to link the question of total withdrawal with the prisoner issue, and he has said that some American troops will remain in Vietnam until the prisoners are released. While he has refused to set a date for complete withdrawal, on the grounds that this would play into Hanoi's hands, it has been widely assumed that there will be no more than about twenty or thirty thousand troops in South Vietnam by mid-1972, or certainly by the time of our Presidential elections. Whatever moral justification there is to the position we have taken on prisoners, we cannot move Hanoi by pleading or threatening or by military action, such as the Son Tay raid, to change its attitude on this matter. Hanoi continues to maintain that the prisoner issue, like others, has to be part of overall negotiations to end the war and must be preceded by our total withdrawal. But on occasion, Hanoi has indicated a willingness to accept the "principle" of complete withdrawal, in other words, an announced schedule pointing to a cut-off date.

I think it is illusory to suppose that we can strike a bargain with Hanoi about mutual troop withdrawals preceded by cease-fires. What I have described elsewhere as the mirage of "the wonderful world of cease-fire" was based on my conviction that, even if there should be a formal halt to the fighting, violence at varying levels will inevitably continue in Indochina for years to come, and no one will ever collect all the guns there and put them in nice little heaps. They will be buried for use another day, as they were in 1954. It is illusory to believe that the Communists do not still want to dominate all of Vietnam, and most of Laos and Cambodia, either through force or through political subversion. Furthermore, Hanoi knows pretty well the number of troops, more or less, we expect to have in Vietnam by mid-1972. It is hard to keep secrets in America. Therefore, I feel that the President could more sharply define his schedule of withdrawal at this point without giving too much away. Or he could move secretly to deal with Hanoi on this subject, and with the prisoner issue very much in mind. Perhaps he has already tried to do this. I do not think that, at present, it would materially help matters for Congress to interfere with the President's activities in this respect. I would, however, favor a resolution calling upon him to move in that direction as fast as possible and requesting him to consult at regular intervals and in confidence with Congress, on a bi-partisan basis.

The Vietnam war, always essentially a political one, is rapidly becoming more political. It is also at the moment reassuming

the shape and substance of a guerrilla conflict, part of what the Communists call protracted warfare, including military, political and diplomatic action. The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong troops, with some important exceptions, are breaking down into small units of five to fifty men. The orders have gone out to "legalize" at least fifty percent of their political cadres—that is, to have them work their way into the government system, including the local self defense forces, and to live openly while still dealing covertly with one superior, on a city block or in a rural hamlet. For the moment anyway, Hanoi has determined to subvert and control the South, or as much of it as possible, by these slower means, although eventually what is called the General Uprising and/or General Offensive, such as was attempted, and failed, during Tet, 1968, may again take place. The emphasis once more is on urban struggle, even while the rural struggle also continues. I am by no means sanguine about the prospects of peace in Indochina. A far-flung guerrilla war may very well continue between the Communists and the nationalists long after war is gone, and embrace Cambodia—Laos is somewhat different because the framework for re-establishing a coalition government exists there, under the 1962 Geneva formula. However, while we have always underestimated Hanoi's threshold of pain—the Laos incursion and the current level of activity on the part of the Communists in South Vietnam are the latest examples—it is also true that the North Vietnamese are weary of this war and that they have faced, and are now facing, by their own admission, some grave economic, management and morale problems. They, too, are scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel—seventy percent of those now working in the fields of North Vietnam are women.

Therefore, I feel that Hanoi may in time welcome at least a hiatus, or a truce, which might, under the best conditions, lead to a process of accommodation in the South. This would not negate the protracted war theory, but it could alter its consequences. Because of that possibility, I believe that the fewest number of troops we leave in Vietnam the soonest, the better it will be. A small contingent of American forces should remain long enough to protect the number of Americans who stay in Vietnam in necessary technical and advisory roles, and to serve as a rehabilitation and reconstruction corps, but I see no need for American combat forces beyond the end of this year. Basic combat support elements as well should be reduced by then to an absolute minimum, perhaps a few battalions. By the end of 1972, or early 1973, no more than a few thousand volunteer advisers and technicians and rehabilitation personnel should remain—the former will be necessary to complete the task of teaching the Vietnamese to use what we have given them. The Vietnamese cannot, in fact, afford to pay for the kind of war they are now fighting. One would like to hope that by that time something more will have been learned about People's War. Far more Vietnamese officers than most of the American military establishment supposes are now ready, willing and eager to re-organize and build down their army and auxiliary forces to meet the demands of People's War. If accommodation and political solutions don't work, that will be the only way the South Vietnamese can fight for their survival. However, properly executed, such a reorganization could in time become part of the accommodation process, to include Vietcong elements.

Accommodation in Vietnam can be attained in various ways. It can start at the top, with an agreement between the Saigon government and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Communists, to start negotiating. It can, and should be preceded by a serious attempt by whatever Saigon re-

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gime is in power to accommodate with the heretofore neglected elements in Vietnamese society—the Buddhists, the members of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, and the mountagnards, which together comprise a majority of the South Vietnamese population. These are things we should have urged forcefully long ago, applying our political leverage, instead of simply pouring aid into Vietnam unconditionally—I should add that I believe in aid without strings under certain circumstances and in certain places, but Vietnam was not one of them. We no longer have much leverage left, but we can still try the art of persuasion more subtly at all levels instead of simply telling people in Independence Palace in Saigon, whoever they may be, how well they are doing and what else they ought to do, and then retiring, amid noddings of Vietnamese and American heads, to the embassy, believing we have accomplished our objectives. This is part of the whole American myth of diplomacy in Vietnam that has led us to wear blinkers for fifteen years. Considering how long we have been there, we do not understand much about the Vietnamese. One year or eighteen months tours of duty are not conducive to acquiring knowledge or fostering patience.

Accommodation can also take place at the village level, which I consider most important. There is no doubt that life for many Vietnamese in the Delta, for example, has improved materially in the past two years—as I have said, not everything we have done, not all aspects of pacification, have been bad. Canals and roads are open, markets are busy, because security in most places has improved. But that doesn't mean most of the population supports the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu. My own scorecard would still read pro-Communist fifteen to twenty percent, pro-Thieu fifteen to twenty percent, and the rest generally uncommitted. But if the government does something about the everlasting and evermore deeply imbedded corruption, and implements land reform properly, which so far is not the case, and if it really sees to it that honest elections are held at all levels, then accommodation becomes possible, both with the uncommitted and with those legal Communist cadres who begin to see that life on the non-Communist side of the fence is better for them and their families. But that will take time, and it is a Vietnamese problem, not ours, though we have certainly abetted corruption. However, it furnishes another reason for our getting out as quickly as possible and letting the Vietnamese solve their own problems in their own way.

While the Communists have refused to participate openly in the Vietnamese elections that have been held in the past and are to be held this summer and fall, for a new House of Representatives in August and for the Presidency in early October, they will undoubtedly participate covertly. They will try to get their sympathizers into the House and, if he runs, they will most likely vote for General Duong Van Minh for President, even though he has abjured them and spoken out against coalition government but in favor of peace. Obviously, the Communists would favor the strongest peace candidate. I would like to express my approval of the resolution introduced by Senator Stevenson or for a similar version, for the establishment of an American observation group from Congress this year far more sophisticated and knowledgeable than the groups that so cursorily watched the elections of 1966 and 1967. What is required is not only Congressional observation but some tough professional advice and participation. It will still be impossible to avoid some rigging, but at least this can be reduced. To inspect the elections properly would require teams of experts in each province down to the village level—a costly undertaking. But having spent as much as we have already in Vietnam, I think

we are justified in coming up with some final appraisals of our own, however, incomplete though they may be. If we can obtain evidence of rigging, then we will know how and why we have failed in prematurely forcing democracy on Vietnam. If Thieu is re-elected and the election is judged reasonably fair, then Hanoi's position in refusing to deal with the Saigon regime is less tenable, and the force of world opinion, including Moscow's if not Peking's, assumes a new perspective. If Thieu is defeated, by Minh or by Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the same would be true.

There are some recent signs that the Communists may favor negotiations next year, perhaps even late this year, though there is also doubt about how serious they would want to be. But there is talk in Paris, as well as elsewhere, of a new Geneva type conference. The decision in Hanoi to eliminate candidates previously chosen from the South, in the elections held in North Vietnam in April of this year for a new National Assembly, was presaged on a desire to allow the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South more leeway to talk with members of the Saigon government. Hanoi would certainly maintain its domination of the P.R.G., but even the semblance of independence, and the indefinite postponement of the issue of unification of the North and South, would help. There is some continuing evidence that, despite their adamant public stand, the Communists might talk secretly with Thieu, if he is re-elected, probably with Minh, and even with Vice President Ky, who often tends to fly like a hawk but also to coo like a dove. All of this is further proof that the Vietnamese, all of them, are tired of the big war and again underlines the advisability of our getting out as soon as feasible. This does not contradict my fears that violence will continue, for the Vietnamese seem to have a self-destructive streak in them which defies western comprehension, though we are self-destructive enough in our own ways, too. The North Vietnamese are like military lemmings, willing to die to the last man down the trail; the South Vietnamese are political lemmings, seemingly incapable of getting together and forming a truly representative government. They might have done better if we had left them alone in this regard and not imposed our western ways upon them, thereby inhibiting what might have been a more natural political, even revolutionary development in the South. Yet despite this lemming concept, one must admit that the Vietnamese have a tremendous capacity for survival, contradictory as this may sound. Vietnam is full of such contradictions.

In any event, I do not think we will easily strike a bargain with Hanoi based on the troop withdrawal question alone. It is better to set a firmer timetable of our own and then wait and see, and hope, letting internal political developments and the accommodation process take their course. Hanoi's demand for a provisional coalition government could still then shift to acceptance of a mixed electoral commission in the South which would be tantamount to temporary coalition, if such a commission were given broad quasi-legislative powers to determine, for example, the *bona fides* of political parties, including the Communist party. I do not think we should concern ourselves with this question, and similar ones, beyond the use of persuasion, once we have negotiated our own way out of Vietnam and solved the prisoner issue. I think Hanoi means what it says about the prisoners—that once we are definite in saying when we'll leave, the issue can be negotiated, before others. This would then be a parallel approach to the natural but slower accommodation process in the South. I doubt that a residue of American advisers and technicians would be a stumbling block, not so long as Peking and Moscow continue to play

such an obvious role in North Vietnam. The question of our continued use of air power must be settled, however. Here, I think, we must be as firm as we can be in making clear that we intend to stop the bombing anywhere and everywhere. The Vietnamese air force has improved rapidly, though it has so far proved itself incapable of waging sophisticated helicopter warfare. It, too, must be left to fight on its own, if necessary, certainly within one year, with continued technical assistance, including spare parts. But the bombing by Americans of all areas of Vietnam, while it has staved off defeat time after time through the years, has become one of our principal national disgraces. Ultimate defeat in an extended guerrilla conflict will never be avoided that way, no matter how many North Vietnamese we kill, or how many South Vietnamese civilians accidentally. The sporadic bombing of North Vietnam at this late date, in reprisal for attacks on reconnaissance planes or other pretexts, gains us very little and merely stiffens morale in the North further.

Your chairman has asked me to speak about "the current situation in Southeast Asia and the probable consequences of various policy alternatives." I think we should do all we can in Laos to further the possibilities of re-establishing the 1962 coalition and to bring an end to the separate war that is being waged in that unfortunate country. There are increasing signs that the North Vietnamese want to colonize at least the eastern half of Laos. The nation's *de facto* partition under a coalition government in Vientiane is probably both inevitable and desirable, given the circumstances, and it seems doubtful that the North Vietnamese will withdraw their troops from the country before some sort of negotiations get underway. They are now deadlocked because Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma demands such a withdrawal first, and the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese are equally adamant in demanding a cessation of American, Lao, and Thai bombing. The bombing in Northern Laos should be stopped, even though it would undoubtedly lead to some further military expansion and consolidation by the Communists, both in the north and south, around the administrative capital of Vientiane as well as the royal capital of Luang Prabang and the entire area of the Bolovens Plateau in the south. But it could probably be contained and negotiations could then almost surely take place. The proffered good offices of the International Control Commission have been all but rejected but there remains a chance that they might at a crucial moment be used. A new Geneva Conference that dealt with the Laos question first could possibly pave the way for a Vietnam solution.

Cambodia is more directly a part of the Vietnam war. Nevertheless, a political resolution is possible there too, though its outlines are fuzzier than in Laos. The Cambodians can accommodate with each other, to include the native Cambodian Communists but probably not the Sihanoukists. At least one such attempt was made a few months ago, in the jungles of Pursat province, but it failed when bombers attacked Communist elements nearby, resulting in the assassination of the five government representatives. Although I opposed the invasion, our role in Cambodia today is justified, it seems to me, in that we are helping the Cambodians help themselves through a program of military and economic assistance. However, there are signs already that we will make the same mistakes we made in Vietnam—in emphasizing conventional rather than unconventional methods of warfare and in not using our leverage of aid to end or at least limit the amount of continuing corruption and to encourage a quicker pace of political re-organization and progress in the formation of an efficient republican form of government. The illness of Prime

Minister Lon Nol, obviously regrettable, nevertheless has offered a fresh opportunity to bring into the government some of the younger and more far-seeing political elements who have been ignored so far or relegated to minor roles. It is too soon to tell if the new cabinet chosen last week is sufficiently representative, but it would not appear to be so.

What is the importance of Southeast Asia to the United States? This, of course, is something we have to determine generally before we can be specific about programs and policies. There are many pressure points in the world and we cannot be equally concerned about all of them, or be a policeman all over the globe. I have always considered Southeast Asia, along with the Middle East and Germany, to be three top critical areas for us, as Americans. It is part of our fundamental historical involvement in Asia, which is and should continue to be concerned with China, first and foremost. The recent events indicating a relaxation of China's hostile attitude are certainly encouraging, although I do not think we should delude ourselves about long-range Chinese intentions. By inviting some ping-pong teams and carefully selected groups of western correspondents to China on guided tours, the Chinese have gained a hundred million dollars worth of publicity, or more. One should not gainsay that, but it remains to be seen how much further they will go, and it remains to be seen whether we will now be willing, as we should have been before, to welcome China into the United Nations and to work toward some sort of solution to the knotty Taiwan problem that will relegate the Taiwanese government to a necessary secondary role akin to Byelorussia's thus still recognizing its right to a seat in the General Assembly. Opening up trade is the lesser part of the equation. Taiwan may very well in the future be part of a single China, as both Taipei and Peking maintain, though they naturally approach the question from different viewpoints. The essential fact remains that China is a great nation and the Chinese are a magnificent people who cannot be ostracized or ignored no matter what form of government they have. If this is true of the Russians, it is equally true of the Chinese, and it has taken us far too long to admit this blunt fact to ourselves.

Our relationship with Japan is next in importance. The Japanese economic thrust into Southeast Asia today is comparable to its military thrust thirty years ago. Tokyo's relationship to Peking remains almost as undefined as ours. Our military alliance with the Japanese is in the process of tenuous readjustment. These are all factors that will have a bearing on events in Southeast Asia in the years ahead. The Nixon Doctrine, by itself, is not clear enough to serve as a permanent guideline to policy. It is all well and good to say that we will help those nations that help themselves. There are many uncertain factors and possibilities that remain. What sort of permanent system of bases are we seeking, if any, on the Asian mainland, or close to it? What sort of naval screen do we want to maintain? Is there a need to maintain a floating force of Marines or to keep other elements stationed in or close to Asia which can be used in emergencies, as President Kennedy did with the Marines in Thailand ten years ago? The Kennedy play worked at that time and might work again under similar circumstances, but we cannot foretell. That brings up the ticklish question of insurgency. When does insurgency reach a level definable as invasion? Suppose North Vietnam or China decides to give more support to the Thai Communist insurgents, now increasing their smallpox pattern of resist-

ance throughout Thailand. We will then be up against some difficult decisions. Probably we will maintain our agreements with Thailand affording us the use of the air bases we built in that country, as well as retain our options in the Philippines. But if the number of insurgents in Thailand doubles, and includes elements of other nations, do we put the bases to use again and start bombing the rebels? There is nothing in the Nixon Doctrine that indicates the answers. What it comes down to, bluntly, is whether we will decide that a specific nation is "worth saving" in its own right, and whether to act or not is in our national interest. I personally feel that, in addition to sustaining our diplomatic-political and economic-social posture, we should maintain some sort of military shield in and around Asia, to include the Philippines and Thailand. In the interests of continuing to improve our relations with China, I think we should withdraw from our military position in Taiwan, but maintain some naval forces in the South China Sea. Our continuing partnership with Australia is essential. Our relations with Indonesia, which comprises half of Southeast Asia's total population of a quarter of a billion people, are also important, and what we have done to spur Indonesia's economic recovery, in concert with eight other nations of the world, particularly Japan, has been a significant contribution to Southeast Asia's well-being. The stability of Indonesia may well determine the stability of the rest of the region, and in many respects Indonesia holds the key to regional cooperation which is proceeding, albeit slowly.

If we cannot definitely predict what we might do if certain situations arise, in Southeast Asia or elsewhere, we can take steps to clarify our policymaking methods and the scope of our potential actions. I do not think the President's hands can or should be tied so firmly that he cannot move in emergencies without Congressional approval. There can, however, be limits set to what the President does on his own, limits as to time and as to the extent of his initial commitment of forces. Nothing as broad as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution should again be passed, and I doubt that it would. But we must do something to improve the poor relationship between the Executive and Congress, which has acquired a guerilla warfare character of its own. Further, there is a tremendous need to redefine the role of various agencies in the government. If the State Department should make and execute foreign policy, what should the role be of the National Security Council and the President's personal advisers? What should the role be of the CIA? Should it be purely an intelligence gathering agency, or should it also have operational functions including counterinsurgency ones, and should it play a part in building political institutions in certain countries where our interests are deemed at stake? We will be faced with repeated conventional as well as unconventional situations in the future, and if we are to avoid more Vietnams we will have to set our own institutional house in order first. It seems to me that this committee, as well as the Committee on Government Operations, should jointly devote themselves to this task. The latter, some ten years ago, held significant hearings and obtained some highly enlightening testimony on the subject of foreign policy making procedures. But little or nothing happened about it all. As a nation, we have a deep self-expiatory streak: we seem to think that the mere process of laying our souls bare, of spelling out what's wrong with the way we do things, settles the matter. I would strongly

recommend that the Foreign Relations Committee consider seriously such measures as that introduced by Senator Magleton and others and then go further in studying the role of the dozen or so government agencies and branches involved in the making and execution of foreign policy. A careful consideration of President Nixon's new plan to reorganize foreign aid would be just one step in this direction. There are many more steps necessary. The alternative of just going along as we have, depending on the personalities of Presidents and the whims of Congress reflecting the many moods of America, could be disastrous. We cannot renounce our role in the world and retire, out of disillusion over Vietnam and other issues, to anything approximating a Fortress America position—there are, fortunately, few signs that we are about to do this. But only by clarifying our purpose and intent and making a far greater effort than we have so far to determine which agencies of government have the right to do what, and what the extent and limit of those obligations are, can we bring order out of the embittered post-Vietnam period.

Thank you.

THE KENNEDY PRESIDENCY

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on March 30, I inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a book review on the White House relationship between a President and his personal staff. Mr. Kenneth P. O'Donnell, a close adviser to President Kennedy, took exception to the review, feeling it did not accurately reflect the Kennedy year.

To make public Mr. O'Donnell's opinion on this issue, I ask that his correspondence with me be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the correspondence was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

KENNETH P. O'DONNELL,
Boston, Mass., April 19, 1971.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
U.S. Senate, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I have read the Congressional Record of March 30, 1971 and, needless to say, it very much disturbed me.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Peters are long-time acquaintances of mine, but I am slightly taken aback by the lack of accuracy in their statements. They quote at great length George Reedy who, in my opinion, discusses a White House that never existed while John Kennedy was President.

I and all of my colleagues can recall hours upon hours of debates, discussions, arguments and disagreements between ourselves and the President of the United States out of which emerged a policy. I heard very few "yes sirs" and the President would not have tolerated them. Every Tuesday morning President Kennedy met with the Congressional Leadership and discussed and argued and debated the policies of the United States Government. John F. Kennedy, as you know, was a constitutionalist who believed totally in the balance of powers between the Executive, Legislative and the Court. There are those who have criticized his legislative accomplishments without validity but it was because he always attempted to reach an accommodation with the legislative branch of the United States.

The Life article described seems to me to prove the President's constitutionality of the United States Senate. Senator Mansfield, as

May 17, 1971

your representative, brilliantly presented your views and brought great influence to bear upon the President of the United States. It so happened that their views and almost all of us on the White House staff (or shall we say, courtiers) were in total agreement that we should not involve ourselves in any military conflict in Viet Nam.

I am disappointed that Mr. Baker and Mr. Peters used the word "war" because there was no "war." There were 16,500 Americans in Viet Nam as I recall. Prior to the President's assassination, Mr. McNamara had announced the withdrawal of 1000 American Advisors. There had been 43 Americans who had lost their lives in the years John F. Kennedy had been President (which is 43 too many) but there was no war. He promised that there would be no war and I am shocked that two distinguished journalists would allow the Congressional Record to be used to confuse history.

I have read George Reedy's book with great interest, and he describes the Johnson Administration but not the Kennedy Administration. I have had the privilege of serving with both, and one of George's points is quite important. Under the Johnson Administration, they did all "yes sir." That was not true in the Kennedy Administration and obviously was not true in the Eisenhower Administration as witness the resignations of General Ridgeway and General Gavin.

As one who served in the White House under two Presidents, I have one suggestion . . . that those who disagree with their Chief in matters of great public policy should have the courage and do have the obligation to resign and present their opposition to the public. In this way, they truly serve this great Republic.

Sincerely,

KENNETH P. O'DONNELL.

APRIL 30, 1971.

Mr. KENNETH P. O'DONNELL,
Boston, Mass.

DEAR KENNETH: I have read your letter in which you take issue with the book review by Mr. Baker and Mr. Peters which I inserted in the Congressional Record of March 30, 1971.

I can understand why you feel that the article may have had relevancy to the White House under President Johnson, but that it did not correctly describe the staff relationship with President Kennedy.

As one who feels that the Kennedy Presidency was a generally bright episode in an otherwise dreadful decade, I would be happy to insert your reply to the Baker-Peters article in the Congressional Record, along with explanatory introductory remarks. I would not do so, of course, without your permission, yours being a personal letter.

I shall await word from you.

Sincerely,

FRANK CHURCH.

BOSTON, MASS., May 4, 1971.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
U.S. Senate, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you very much for your reply, and I would be delighted if you would be willing to place in the Congressional Record a contrary viewpoint.

As I have simmered since reading the article and well recall the violent discussions on the Missile Crisis where Governor Stevenson and some others were almost involved in fistfights, I pall at this kind of distortion of history.

I remember the vigorous exchanges concerning the use of American military power, the use of tactical air weapons and the almost violent responses of the civilian members of our military establishment. I recall vividly where the President, unlike some of his successors, sought the advice and consent of the Congressional leadership at meet-

ings in the White House where the arguments and discussions were furious and, perhaps never resolved.

In my four brief years in the White House, I again reiterate, the President made the ultimate decisions but neither the Congress nor his staff were subservient.

With my deepest respect.

Sincerely,

KENNETH P. O'DONNELL.

PAUL A. BOULO, JR., KNIGHT IN THE ORDER OF ORANGE NASSAU

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, it is a source of pleasure and pride to me when a fellow Alabamian is singled out for honor in recognition of extraordinary achievements. Recently, a distinguished citizen of Mobile, Ala., received such an honor from Queen Juliana of Holland who, by royal decree, designated Paul A. Boulo a Knight in the Order of Orange Nassau in recognition of his outstanding services as an honorary consul for the Netherlands at Mobile.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article which appeared in the Mobile Press on Friday, May 7, 1971, describing the circumstances of this award be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Mobile Press, May 7, 1971]

MOBILIAN NOW SIR PAUL BOULO—NETHERLANDS CONSUL KNIGHTED

He went to a birthday party in honor of the queen, discovered he was the guest of honor and emerged as a knight.

Paul A. Boulo Jr., honorary consul for the Netherlands at Mobile, today proudly wears the medal designating him, by royal decree of Queen Juliana, a Knight in the Order of Orange Nassau.

Boulo received the honor at a reception at the World Trade Club in Houston, Tex., from F. A. Hoeffer, consulate general of the Netherlands, before 300 applauding guests on April 30. Boulo has been notified by Netherlands Ambassador R. B. Baron von Lynden that the queen's decree bestowing knighthood upon him will be forwarded to Mobile.

The award is the highest civilian honor the queen can bestow in recognition of services to the crown and country.

Boulo's knighthood came from distinguished consular services at Mobile since 1953. He became honorary vice consul then, succeeding his father in the position after his death.

Boulo's friends say the queen could not have honored a finer fellow. He suffered a crippling automobile accident several years ago, but declined to bow to fate and accept the life of an invalid.

Today he gets about on a cane, continues active direction of his company, Paul A. Boulo, foreign freight broker and forwarding agent. He pilots his 50-foot yacht, the Lyreb, entertaining customers aboard, and incidentally does a good job of selling the Port of Mobile.

The Boulos have been associated with the sea and the waterfront for generations. Boulo has documentary evidence in his possession indicating that one of his ancestors was in the Holy Crusade to Siria Pulgine in 1250 A.D. and commandel a Geonese galley in the Battle of Malonia.

The name originally was Bollo, but was later changed to Boulo after his great-grandfather Philip Boulo, a merchant seaman, emigrated from Italy to Mobile in 1825 and established a ship chandlery and bar near the waterfront. His grandfather owned sailing ships that plied the coastal trade, and his

father carried on a freight forwarding business, which Boulo continues to operate.

So now it's Sir Paul Boulo—and his friends salute him with delight. Boulo has served in numerous civic and sports organizations and the queen's recognition adds new honors to a distinguished career.

HARPER COLLEGE GRANTED UNQUALIFIED ACCREDITATION

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the State of Illinois took a major step to increase the availability of higher education for Illinois citizens by enacting the Illinois Public Junior College Act of 1965. Since then, our State system of community colleges has expanded and improved at an impressive rate.

One of the most brilliant examples of what has been accomplished is the recent accreditation granted to William Rainey Harper College in Palatine, Ill. Harper, established by voter referendum in 1965, is the newest Illinois college to be so honored. In January of this year, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools granted full accreditation without qualification to Harper.

Mr. President, at this point, I ask unanimous consent that the news release announcing the association's action be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the news release was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

COMMUNITY COLLEGE PRESIDENT, ROBERT E. LAHTI, ANNOUNCES THAT ACCREDITING BODY'S ACTION IS "WITHOUT QUALIFICATION"

William Rainey Harper College in Palatine, public community junior college (District #512) established by voter referendum in 1965, has been granted full accreditation by the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.

Harper is the "youngest" public two-year institution operating under the Illinois junior college act of 1965. Rock Valley College in Rockford (District #511), which also received full accreditation this week, was established one year earlier than Harper.

In announcing the action by the accrediting body, Robert E. Lahti, Harper's president, stated "Harper has reached this important milestone with all due haste for a new institution which has taken on the challenge of providing comprehensive community college services to its constituencies." He added that the North Central Association had fully accredited Harper "without qualification."

According to the Harper president, full accreditation means that the college's credits and quality of instruction have unquestioned reciprocity among all institutions of higher education. "This is, of course, most important to our students and their families while at the same time it is a tribute to our faculty," at the same time it is a tribute to our faculty," he said. Dr. Lahti added that accreditation also means that a faculty is "more free" to pursue innovative approaches to the learning process.

The North Central Association based its decision to accredit Harper partly upon the report by a six-member examining team which visited the college on January eighth and ninth. "The decision was also based upon an exhaustive self-study of Harper by the college faculty last year and my own appearance before a final examining board in Chicago earlier this week," Dr. Lahti explained.

Conclusions stated in the North Central report of its January visit to Harper stated,